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A LETTER

TO

His Grace the Duke of Portland,

BEING A

DEFENCE of the CONDUCT

OF

HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTERS,

IN SENDING AN AMBASSADOR TO TREAT FOR PEACE

WITH THE

FRENCH DIRECTORY,

AGAINST THE

ATTACK MADE UPON THAT MEASURE

BY THE

RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE;

AND AN ENDEAVOUR TO PROVE THAT THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT OF THE

FRENCH REPUBLIC

Is compatible with the Safety of the Religious and Political Systems of

EUROPE.

SECOND EDITION.

By JAMES WORKMAN, Esq.
OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE.

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ERRATUM.

In page 21, line third from the bottom, read Potentates of Europe.

A

LETTER

TO

The DUKE of PORTLAND.

My Lord,

THOSE who are leaſt diſpoſed to admit the juſtice of an author's prejudice in favor of the ſubject he has choſen, will not be ſo hardy as to deny the importance of that on which I have now the honor to addreſs your Grace, when its difficulties occupy the talents of the moſt able, and its conſequences fill the minds of the moſt courageous with anxiety. It was in the auſpicious moment when the wiſdom of his Majeſty's councils had induced him to make an effort to extinguiſh the flames of war which have ſo long and ſo violently raged throughout the

world, that a writer whoſe ability is hardly ſurpaſſed by his zeal, endeavours to light them up with fiercer fury than they have yet diſplayed and to feed them with ſuch fuel that no one living could expect to ſee the end of their devouring progreſs.

That his arguments againſt negotiating for peace with France, maintained with all his wonted acuteneſs of reaſoning, and adorned with all the ſplendor of his unfaded imagination, may make a deep impreſſion upon the Legiſlature and his Majeſty's Miniſters is reaſonably to be apprehended; and the objects of this letter are to prevent your Grace from being among the number of thoſe on whom ſuch impreſſion may be made, and to ſave the country from the heavy misfortunes which ſhe might ſuffer if his Majeſty were counſelled and the Public perſuaded to act upon the opinions of Mr. Burke, by a Miniſter whoſe high character, acknowledged by every party for public and domeſtic virtues, would give force to his perſuaſions and his advice. I entertain too high an opinion of your Grace's good ſenſe and politeneſs to ſuppoſe that you will deem this addreſs preſumptuous, or even require it to be prefaced with much apology. The greatneſs of the danger in which our country might be placed, affords an excuſe for the humbleſt endeavour to avert it; and

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and the poſſibility of ſuggeſting an hint which may be uſeful in the conduct of any of her important affairs, ſeems to me a full juſtification of him who publiſhes his obſervations on ſo high a national concern as that which I have undertaken to diſcuſs.

The ſubſtance of Mr. Burke's Letters is nearly contained in the following propoſitions:

1ſt. That his Majeſty's Miniſters ſhould not have recognized and negotiated with the Government of the French Republic, becauſe the true and lawful French Nation is not now repreſented by that Government, nor to be found within the limits of geographical France, but in the foreign countries in which her lawful repreſentatives are exiles.

2d. That his Majeſty's Miniſters ſhould not have recognized and ſhould not negotiate for peace with the French Republic, becauſe ſhe is of a wicked and abominable character, being governed by infamous robbers and murderers.

3d. That if we make peace with the French Republic, we ſhall not long be able to preſerve our religion, property, conſtitution, or laws; and that the whole ſyſtem of religion, laws,

government, uſages, morals and manners now eſtabliſhed in Europe will be deſtroyed.

4th. That we ought therefore to continue the war until we ſubvert the Republican Government of France and the whole ſyſtem on which it depends; that we ſhould oppoſe to it for this purpoſe a force, bearing ſome analogy and reſemblance to the force and ſpirit which that ſyſtem exerts, and that our reſources for carrying on war are ſtill great and abundant.

I ſhall examine thoſe propoſitions diſtinctly and nearly in the order in which I have arranged them.

The diſtinction made by Mr. Burke between the ſuppoſed moral nation of France, conſiſting of her exiled Prince and her expelled Nobility, Clergy and Gentry, and that ſuppoſed unlawful French Nation which now exiſts within the territories of France, and is repreſented by the preſent French Government may afford one ſubject of diſpute on the right meaning of words, and another on the conduct which the Governments of Europe ſhould obſerve with reſpect to recognizing and negotiating with one or other of thoſe rival Nations. Which of the two ought to be called with propriety the true French Nation, or the true body politic

of

of France, is a queſtion rather verbal than political, and therefore improper to be examined in a work profeſſing only political diſcuſſion; nor is it within the ſcope of ſuch a work to determine which of the two has the beſt claim to the affection of Frenchmen and to the eſteem of mankind. But which of the two his Majeſty ſhould recognize in order to negotiate with, of right and for the advantage of his ſubjects, is a queſtion on which Mr. Burke's opinion ſeems refutable with as much certainty as can be expected in any political demonſtration.

When nations are ſaid to recognize, correſpond or negotiate with one another, nothing elſe can be meant than that ſome perſon or perſons (almoſt always their Governments or certain branches of their Governments) are appointed to repreſent their reſpective nations. In no other mode can one nation, country, or people recognize or treat with another in its corporate capacity.

For what purpoſe is it that the Governments of nations or countries ſhould correſpond and negotiate with each other? Certainly for the benefit, either immediate or remote, of their reſpective ſubjects. It is this end which all the great objects of negotiation ſhould have, and which it is always profeſſed that they have in view. For what other

good purpoſe can it be required to aſcertain boundaries, to determine diſputed rights, or to regulate commercial intercourſe?

When two Governments negotiate a treaty, they in fact do no more than make a law to bind the ſubjects of both. With whom then as the repreſentative, and on the part of the French people is his Majeſty, for the benefit of his ſubjects, to negotiate in order to aſcertain boundaries, to determine diſputed rights, to regulate commercial intercourſe but with the perſons who have the power to make laws for the French people, and to bind them to the obſervance of ſuch agreements, reſtrictions and regulations, as in conſideration of others for the benefit of the people of France, the repreſentative of that people might agree to for the benefit of the people of England?

To negotiate a treaty, that is to join in an act of legiſlation with perſons who have no power to legiſlate and whoſe laws would not only be diſobeyed but deſpiſed by thoſe whom they are intended (if they mean any thing) to bind, would be abſurd and even ridiculous. To recognize as a national authority any perſons who have no power to negotiate would be a mere ceremony which whatever pleaſure it might afford to the correſponding parties, could be of no advantage to the ſubjects of him who made the recognition.

None

None therefore who do not poſſeſs power to legiſlate, are of competence to be recognized or treated with as the repreſentative of a nation.

It is with a view to the intereſt of its ſubjects and not from eſteem, pity or affection, that a Government acting upon juſt principles will begin and conduct its negotiations. It is not certainly to pleaſe or to do honor to France, or to any perſons in France, or to any king or kingdom on earth that his Majeſty negotiates treaties; but to remove the inconveniences under which his faithful people might labour, and to ſecure to them the advantages which they might not enjoy, if ſuch negotiation were neglected. No one is ignorant that it would be for the benefit of the people of this country, to have their right to various places, which have been taken from the French in the Indies acknowledged and aſcertained, and to have power to reſume commercial intercourſe according to fixed and known regulations with the people inhabiting the territories of France. But how is this right to be ſatisfactorily aſcertained, and by whom are thoſe regulations to be enforced, but by thoſe whom the people inhabiting the territories of France obey? Let your Grace imagine that you were appointed Ambaſſador to what Mr. Burke calls the true French Nation, and that you were introduced to Louis and a Council of

his

his exiled Nobility. Pity as well as your inſtructions might induce you to call him rightful King of France, and to recognize him and his unhappy companions as the rightful repreſentatives of the French nation. You might lament their hard lot and wiſh them more proſperous fortunes. But could you, by this embaſſy, accompliſh any thing towards the only object that could juſtify an Embaſſy, the advantage of your country? Could you ſave the property of our merchants from the annoyance of French privateers? Could you open the rich markets of France, Spain and Holland to their manufactures? Could you ſecure to the Eaſt India Company the undiſturbed poſſeſſion of Pondicherry, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon or Malacca? Would not the unhappy Prince conſider any propoſal to him, in his preſent circumſtances, to obtain any of theſe advantages as a moſt cruel inſult*? Might not your Grace as wiſely

* Having mentioned the name of Louis, I cannot help expreſſing my ſincere wiſh that the French Directory, diſregarding his denunciations of vengeance, will ceaſe to exerciſe towards that unfortunate Prince, the unrelenting rigor with which they have hitherto purſued him; and that if incapable of being moved by the voice of pity, they will be too proud to let the world imagine that any individual can diſturb their repoſe, and too magnanimous to perſecute a man without power and almoſt without friends. I would alſo hope that whatever turn the popular opinion may take among us, the Britiſh Nation will be too gene-

wiſely treat with him reſpecting our intercourſe with Canton or Conſtantinople, as with Paris? Mr. Burke may uſe the words French Nation in whatever ſenſe his ingenuity or his affections may ſuggeſt. But the French nation with which the Governments of Europe have any buſineſs to negotiate, and which his Majeſty on the part of his faithful people was wiſely adviſed to acknowledge, is that people which now inhabits geographical France. With the members of the former and now exiled corporate body of France, his Majeſty's ſubjects have no intercourſe or connexion that requires any other regulations than ſuch as may be obtained by negotiating with the Governments of the countries in which the unhappy exiles reſide.

But ſuppoſe that this exiled corporate body did poſſeſs conſiderable power; or that one quarter,

generous, or rather too juſt, to abandon the perſons whom it has encouraged to wage war againſt their country; and that, great as the preſſure of neceſſary burdens may be, ſomething more will be endured to ſave them from famine and death and the Britiſh character from infamy. We ſtill poſſeſs fertile and delightful regions on the other ſide of the Atlantic. The French Emigrants cannot perhaps find a better lot than to be well ſettled in them: and although this arrangement would require a conſiderable diſburſement from the public, the firſt expence would be the final one.

or one half of the French people had emigrated from France;—with which quarter or half ſhould his Majeſty negotiate? The queſtion is anſwered by applying to the principle. A Government ſhould recognize in every independent political body with which it holds correſpondence, juſt ſo much dominion as that Body actually poſſeſſes, and ſhould negotiate with it ſo far as the neceſſities or convenience of its ſubjects may require. If one half of the French people had emigrated, ſubmitting as the actual emigrants have done to the Governments of the countries into which they fled, they would have no title, being ſubjects, to be recognized as an independent nation or people; nor would his Majeſty, for the purpoſe of maintaining the relations that he might wiſh to exiſt between them and his ſubjects, find it neceſſary to recognize or negotiate with any other Governments than thoſe which theſe emigrants obeyed. But if ſuch emigrants, ambitious of becoming an independent people, had been ſtrong enough to have given effect and indulgence to their ambition, then it might be prudent in his Majeſty to recognize them as a nation, and to treat with them for all objects connected with the proſperity of this country over which they might have any command. Whether the ſtationary or the emigrated half of the people of France ſhould be called the true French nation, might be the ſubject of much

much altercation between the candidates for the title. But prudent ſtrangers, not fond of quarrelling about words, would eaſily avoid the diſpute, by giving to the rivals ſome titles of diſtinction which would not be offenſive to the pretenſions of either of them.

I again repeat it, that if a Prince recognizes and negotiates with nations, or rather with the perſons who repreſent them, for the advantage of his ſubjects and not merely to gratify his private feelings, he muſt recognize thoſe only who are able to make the people compoſing ſuch nations conform to the regulations which for the advantage of his ſubjects he may think proper to propoſe.

He ſhould conſider that he negotiates with the governor of a geographical diſtrict, containing ſo many inhabitants, no matter what the country of their nativity. For a Government can undertake to bind its ſubjects only; and none are *actually* ſubject to it but the inhabitants of its territory. When therefore we make a treaty with any power, with France for inſtance, it is never underſtood that the treaty ſhall be obeyed by all Frenchmen, but by all the ſubjects of France. If the intereſt of our commerce ſhould require the intercourſe between our merchants and the

Frenchmen who dwell in Cadiz or New-Orleans to be regulated in a particular manner, his Majeſty would apply, not to the Government of France, but to the Court of Madrid to negotiate the regulations.

I urge this circumſtance as an anſwer to the contempt with which Mr. Burke conſiders geographical arrangement in recognizing and negotiating with a nation. It proves as far as the eſtabliſhed practice of all ſtates can prove, not only that it is not poſſible for any perſons without the territorial poſſeſſions of their nation, to be that nation or its repreſentative for the purpoſe of being negotiated with, but that perſons who quit the territories of their nation are no longer even a part of it for that purpoſe. They muſt be conſidered either as forming a new nation, or as increaſing the population and power of an old one.

To illuſtrate his opinion, Mr. Burke ſuppoſes a dreadful calamity. He ſuppoſes all the royal family ſacrilegiouſly murdered, and all the perſons of worth, wiſdom and reſpectability that England contains impriſoned, plundered, exiled or murdered by a faction of robbers. Is it, he demands, to this faction he is to look for his country?

Would

Would not the exiles alone be his Government and his fellow-citizens? Would not their places of refuge be his temporary country? Would not all his duties and all his affections be there and there only? What ſhould he think if the potentates of Europe, being geographers inſtead of kings, recognized this geometrical meaſurement as the honorable member of Europe called England?

This caſe forms no exception to the principle which I have ventured to lay down. Without impugning it, all of Mr. Burke's queſtions that are not purely verbal may be ſatisfactorily anſwered.

It is obſervable that with his uſual dexterity in the management of arguments and analogies, he preſumes that the duties of a Britiſh citizen and a foreign potentate, with regard to a Britiſh government, may be ſtrictly and exactly the ſame. But this cannot happen. A Government, with regard to the citizen, is or ought to be a juſt and moral power. A Government with regard to a foreign potentate is a phyſical power, which, acting within its proper range, is independent of him by the laws of public right, and which it is his duty as a potentate to regard chiefly as it may affect the condition of his ſubjects. In Mr. Burke's

Burke's caſe the affections and the duties* of every good citizen would certainly be with the exiles and the reſt of his oppreſſed countrymen, and he ſhould make every poſſible effort to deliver them from tyranny and to puniſh their tyrants. But the good citizen and the wiſe potentate would have different duties to obſerve. The one is bound to conſider in the firſt place the rights and the happineſs of his commonwealth; the other the welfare of his kingdom. The one acts entirely for the benefit of his countrymen, the other chiefly for the ſafety and proſperity of his ſubjects. The one ſhould neither obey nor recognize any Government, (unleſs obliged by neceſſity or induced by ſtrong conſiderations of prudence) except the rightful one; but ſhould endeavour by all poſſible means to ſubvert any Government founded on the robbery of his countrymen and the violation of his country's rights; the other ſhould recognize any Government whatever, and ſhould, if poſſible, avoid going to war with any Government, however vile, that had the power to deſtroy the happineſs of his people.

* I ſay the duties, for I cannot admit as a moral rule of conduct that part of our law which would juſtify us in yielding our obedience and giving our ſupport to the vileſt perſon in the world, if he were by any means to get poſſeſſion of his Majeſty's throne. See 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 36, and Blackſtone's Commentaries, Vol. 4th, 78.

I do

I do not deny that this potentate would have a right to deliver our countrymen from the tyranny of the robbers. God forbid I ſhould maintain ſuch a ſelfiſh and ungenerous doctrine, as that human beings can ever be bound by their duty to behold tamely the wrongs of any of their fellow creatures, or that any people have not a full right to reſcue any other from a galling bondage. Our affections ſhould not be wholly abſorbed by our country; they ought to extend to the whole human race.

But this right of one Government to interfere by force on behalf of the oppreſſed ſubjects of another, can only be acknowledged with ſevere reſtrictions, and muſt not be exerciſed but with great prudence. It would otherwiſe occaſion endleſs wars and defeat its own generous purpoſes. The oppreſſion that may be thus lawfully removed muſt be obvious, flagrant and galling. We have no right to redreſs any grievances in a foreign country that are not ſeverely felt and loudly complained of; for no right can exiſt that would allow any one nation in the world to diſturb at its pleaſure the peace of all the reſt. The potentate who would achieve the emancipation of an enſlaved people ſhould be morally certain that he is able to perform what he wiſhes to undertake. If he fails in his attempt he may not only ruin his

his own ſubjects, but by enraging the tyrants, he will certainly make the condition of their victims more deplorable. He ſhould alſo be well aſſured that the changes which he intends to introduce or countenance will be not only good in themſelves, but agreeable to the objects of his generoſity. Indeed his right extends no further than to deliver them from their oppreſſors. He may recommend meaſures; but if he enforces any that are important, againſt the inclination of the country for which they are deſigned, he vitiates all his proceedings from the beginning. His conduct ſhews that he was not actuated by benevolence but ambition. He is to be regarded not as a deliverer but as a conqueror. The tranſition from one of theſe characters to the other is ſo eaſy and natural, and has happened ſo very often, that a wiſe citizen will endure much before he ſeeks deliverance from a foreign power. Had your Grace lived in England during the tyranny of the fanatics, I am ſure that you would not have called upon the Czar of Moſcovy to deliver you; and that if he had ſent over his armies here for that purpoſe, you would have oppoſed them almoſt as zealouſly as if he had declared that his objects were conqueſt and plunder.

Applying theſe principles to the ſolution of Mr. Burke's queſtions: any Potentate of Europe would have

have a full right to reſtore to us our liberties by force, if he were called upon by the voice or the feelings of the country. But he would not be morally bound to interfere thus in our concerns, if it were probable or even poſſible that his interference might ruin his kingdom. He would owe a duty indeed to our enſlaved countrymen, but a much higher duty to his own ſubjects.

Suppoſe the ſituation of England was what Mr. Burke has imagined, and that your Grace was at the ſame time a Miniſter, directing the councils of any foreign State; of the kingdom of Portugal, for inſtance, or the republic of the United States of America. Would you refuſe to recognize the Engliſh faction of robbers, if you knew that the refuſal would ſtimulate them to interrupt an advantageous intercourſe between England and your country; to plunder your merchants; to deſtroy your colonies or States; and perhaps to ſend out a navy that might lay Liſbon or Philadelphia in aſhes? In theſe circumſtances you certainly ought not to refuſe. You would have no right to ſport with the high charge entruſted to your keeping, nor to bring ruin on your country for any claſs of perſons, however deſerving and unfortunate.

But the queſtion of war or peace is not implicated in this queſtion of recognition. We ought to recognize and correſpond with the Government of a State which is our enemy, on the ſame principle of mutual advantage that would induce us to negotiate with that State, if it were our friend. Correſpondence between Governments may diminiſh the calamities of their ſubjects in war almoſt as much as it can augment their proſperity in peace. In the proſecution of hoſtilities, how detrimental would it be to the belligerent parties, if conventions, which imply recognition, and which cannot take place without correſpondence, were not entered into concerning the obſervance of capitulations, the exchange or ranſom of priſoners, the care of the wounded, and the ſignals of defiance and ſubmiſſion? With whom, on the part of the warriors oppoſed to us, can we negotiate theſe conventions? With thoſe only who are competent to undertake for the conduct of thoſe warriors, that is, with the perſons whom thoſe warriors obey.

If, therefore, it were even right to continue the war with France for the ſubverſion of her government, laws and manners, or for the reſtoration of the exiled king, or for any other object, it would be right to acknowledge as a Nation the people, however wicked or deluded, that we are

fighting

fighting with, and to recognize as the Repreſentative of that Nation, the Government, however infamous, which it obeys. Our recognition would not retard for one moment the attainment of our object, if it were attainable, and whether attainable or not, the recognition, without occaſioning any evil, would be productive of many advantages to us, which without recognition we could not poſſeſs. It would be quite time enough to refuſe or withdraw our recognition of this Government when we had accompliſhed its deſtruction.

" Mere locality," ſays Mr. Burke, " does not " conſtitute a body politic. Had Cade and his " gang got poſſeſſion of London, they would not " have been the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and " Common Council."——True; they would not have been the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council, any more than the Directory, the Legiſlative Councils, and the exiſting Tribunals of France are the King, the States-General, and the ancient Parliaments. But yet had Cade maintained poſſeſſion of London in ſpite of all the exertions of the Government; had he deſtroyed or plundered all thoſe who attempted to expel him from that city, and had he obtained, either by force, fraud, or perſuaſion, the obedience of the citizens, it would have been unwiſe in the citizens of York or Briſtol, whoſe affairs might

require them to come to the metropolis, to have refuſed to call Jack Cade Lord Mortimer, or to have given him any other title which his Lordſhip might have thought proper to aſſume. By making this recognition, they would probably have been able to proſecute their affairs without interruption; and by refuſing it, they would not only have deprived themſelves of many commercial advantages, but would have ſubjected themſelves to the depredations of his Lordſhip's gang; although their refuſal to acknowledge his title could not have had the ſmalleſt tendency to mitigate the evil or abridge the period of his uſurpation*.

The acknowledgment by Henry VI. of Cade's title to govern London would not have been in the leaſt ſimilar to the late acknowledgment of the French Republic by his Majeſty. Cade was the lawful ſubject, and London of the lawful

* Second part of Henry VI. Scene VI.

Enter JACK CADE.

CADE. Now is Mortimer Lord of this city.—And now, henceforward, it ſhall be treaſon for any that calls me other than Lord Mortimer.

Enter a ſoldier running.

SOLDIER. Jack Cade! Jack Cade!

CADE. Knock him down there. [They kill him.]

SMITH. If this fellow be wiſe, he'll never call you Jack Cade any more; I think he hath a very fair warning.

dominions

dominions of Henry. The French Government is certainly not the lawful ſubject of ours, nor of any other Government, nor is France among the lawful dominions of his Majeſty. Had Henry VI. acknowledged Cade's title, he would by that acknowledgment have releaſed Cade's allegiance, and have given up to him an important part of his own dominions. His Majeſty has not by the act of acknowledging the French Government releaſed to the perſons compoſing it, any debt of allegiance, nor recognized in them any right to any title or territory to which his Majeſty had any lawful claim.

The ſecond propoſition deducible from Mr. Burke's letters, is, "That his Majeſty's Miniſters ſhould not have recognized, and ſhould not negotiate for peace with the French Republic, becauſe ſhe is of a wicked and abominable character, being governed by infamous robbers and murderers."

Admitting for the argument that ſhe is of this character, and is ſo governed, the inference of Mr. Burke will not follow: becauſe his Majeſty, according to the practice of his illuſtrious predeceſſors, and of moſt of the Potentates in Europe, has long recognized the Government of what Mr. Burke calls the *Republic* of Algiers, a Govern-

ment

ment of as wicked and abominable a character as can well exiſt, and compoſed of as infamous materials as can enter into the compoſition of any public body whatever.

But Mr. Burke maintains that the analogical argument drawn from Algiers is not concluſive; for although he is willing to admit that this Algerine State has a Conſtitution ſimilar to what he calls the preſent tumultuous military tyranny of Fance, and that the Algerine community reſembles the community of France, yet he fears great danger from the recognition of the French Republic, and little or none from the recognition of Algiers. Algiers, he obſerves, is not near us, not powerful, not infectious; and as it is an old creation we have good data to calculate the whole of the miſchief to be apprehended from it.

To determine whether or not a Government of an abominable character, and compoſed of infamous men ſhould be recognized and negotiated with, we muſt be guided by conſiderations either of national character or national intereſt; we can only juſtify our refuſal to recognize any State by a conviction that the meaſure is either diſhonorable or imprudent.

If the queſtion relative to the recognition of the French Republic, is upon the point of honor, the

the precedent of Algiers, notwithſtanding what has been objected by Mr. Burke, is of ſufficient authority to juſtify his Majeſty's adviſers; for conſiderations of danger can not be applied to determine a point of honor. They belong ſolely to queſtions of prudence and caution. If it be a ſtain upon our national honor, that we recognize and negotiate with Governments of infamous character and compoſed of infamous men, the ſtain is the ſame whatever power thoſe Governments may poſſeſs, and in whatever part of the world they may be ſituated. It can certainly be no extenuation of the diſhonor that may be incurred by a nation in recognizing and correſponding with infamy, that it reſides at ſome hundred miles diſtance, or that it has preſerved for any length of time the conſiſtency of its abominable character. His Majeſty's Miniſters therefore in acknowledging the French Republic, however abominable its character, and however infamous the perſons by whom it is governed, have not diſhonored the Britiſh character unleſs our anceſtors have diſhonored it by acknowledging the Government of Algiers. But ſurely no Engliſhmen can be offended that the honor of his country is not now maintained with greater punctilioufneſs than was ever obſerved by his renowned and dreaded anceſtors.

Conſidering

Conſidering the recognition of the Algerine Government only as a meaſure of prudence, the argument drawn from its analogy is irrefragable, as applied to the recognition of the Government of France.

The dangers that Mr. Burke would apprehend if Algiers were in our neighbourhood, could not poſſibly ariſe from recognizing that State, but from the intercourſe that might exiſt between its ſubjects and his Majeſty's. But the act of recognizing a Government does not imply permiſſion of unreſtrained intercourſe. Were Algiers our neighbour, it might be the purpoſe of a negotiation to limit or reſtrain the intercourſe between the two countries, if both of them apprehended that without limitation or reſtriction it would be dangerous: If only one of them entertained this apprehenſion, negotiation would be unneceſſary, becauſe the Legiſlature of that one, as long as it maintained its independence, might adopt meaſures as ſtrong and efficacious as any circumſtances could require. Moſt if not all of the Governments of Europe do now actually regulate or reſtrain, as ſeems beſt to them, the intercourſe between their ſubjects and the ſubjects of other States, of thoſe even with which they are in the ſtricteſt amity. The French Republic will ſurely never attempt to dictate to us meaſures of internal police; to tell us that we muſt admit amongſt us ſuch and as many of her citizens as

may

think proper to viſit or reſide in our Iſland, or if ſhe does no miniſter of the Majeſty of Great Britain will ever comply with her inſolence.

It is not the recognition but the refuſal to make recognition of a State that can be attended with danger. Why is it prudent for Miniſters to recognize and negotiate with the Government of Algiers? Becauſe they obtain from it a forbearance of piracy. But if for this reaſon it is prudent to recognize and negotiate with the robbers of Algiers, who can proſecute their depredations on our property, with but a few and thoſe miſerably armed veſſels, and who with their whole force could not expect to conquer and keep poſſeſſion of the weakeſt of our colonies; would it not be imprudent, nay even downright madneſs to refuſe to recognize and negotiate with the robbers of France, (if indeed the French Government be a Government of robbers) who can proſecute their depredations on our property with fifty ſhips of the line, and ſix times that number of ſtout frigates and privateers of their own, and with fifty other ſhips of the line, and three or four times that number of frigates and privateers which they have either forced or perſuaded their friends to arm againſt us; who would probably capture a thouſand of our merchantmen, in the ſame time that the Algerine robbers could take a ſcore; who with much ſhort of their whole force, could conquer or deſtroy our moſt flouriſhing Colonies,

and who in the arrogance and audacity of their preſumptuous imaginations, have even dared to meditate the conqueſt of the Empire itſelf? Would it be prudent to avoid a waſp and encounter a tyger? to ſoothe the anger of a miſchievous dwarf, and rouſe the rage of a ferocious giant?

Since then it is a meaſure of prudence, and according to the practice of the beſt times of Engliſh dignity, not an act of diſhonor, to recognize and negotiate with the Government of Algiers, it is much more ſtrongly a meaſure of prudence, and in the ſame degree conſiſtent with national honor to recognize and negotiate with the Government of the French Republic, admitting that it conſiſts of ſuch infamous robbers and murderers as compoſe the Government of Algiers. The precedent quoted from the Algerine reports is therefore, (with admiſſions moſt ſevere and unfavourable on the part of the caſe to which it is applied) of full and deciſive authority. On this ground therefore let the rule obtained to ſhew cauſe why his Majeſty ſhould not recognize and negotiate with the French Republic be made abſolute.

Viewing the preſent and the former ſtate of the powers of Europe, do we find that any one of them has loſt by recognizing or gained by refuſing to recognize the Government of the French Republic? Not the late Sovereign of Ruſſia, certainly,

tainly, for ſhe might have poſſeſſed herſelf of Poland with the ſame facility, and perhaps with better grace and more conſiſtency of character, had ſhe maintained the moſt friendly correſpondence with the robber and exterminator Roberſpierre. Has Denmark, or free America, or Pruſſia or Hanover loſt any thing by recognizing the French Republic? Has the late King of Sardinia, or the Duke of Wertemburgh, or any other Potentate of Europe, gained any thing by refuſing to recognize and negotiate with that Republic?

The wiſh of Mr. Burke that the Governments of Europe ſhould not acknowledge the preſent Government of France, and that they ſhould continue the war until that Government is deſtroyed, proceeds, I am fully perſuaded, from as pure and noble motives as can actuate the human heart. He has been led to think that that Government is guilty of every crime, turpitude, and oppreſſion towards its ſubjects, whoſe deliverance from what he calls the vileſt and ſevereſt tyranny that ever ſcourged the earth, as well as the puniſhment of their tyrants, is among the great ends which he purpoſes to accompliſh by continuing the war. Without entering for the preſent into the queſtion of our ability to puniſh the ſuppoſed oppreſſors of France, it muſt be confeſſed that Mr. Burke, informed as he has been, entertains

generous purpoſes. What purpoſe more virtuous and noble than to deliver the oppreſſed? But we have good reaſon to know that with regard to the affairs of France, this gentleman has been egregiouſly deceived. From many and important events of univerſal notoriety, it muſt appear as ridiculous as impolitic to continue the war any longer in order to puniſh the Government of France for oppreſſing her people. The people of France have not only not ſolicited us to deliver them from any oppreſſion, or to puniſh their ſuppoſed oppreſſors, but they have themſelves puniſhed moſt ſeverely all who have attempted to do either. Suppoſing then that the wickedneſs and the tyranny of the preſent rulers of France are as odious and oppreſſive as Mr. Burke's information induces him to believe, the people of France highly deſerve whatever they may ſuffer, for having treated with ſuch rudeneſs and ingratitude all the armies which the allies have ever ſent for their deliverance. Let us therefore abandon this ungrateful people to the mercy of their Government; let us no longer puniſh ourſelves, nor even ſubject ourſelves to the ſlighteſt inconvenience to emancipate the one or puniſh the other, and let no oppreſſion that may be exerciſed upon perſons who are ſo willing to endure oppreſſion, retard for one moment the re-eſtabliſhment of tranquillity in England.

Your

Your Grace will undoubtedly have obſerved that in proving, if I have indeed proved, the propriety of recognizing and negotiating with the moſt wicked and infamous Governments, I have performed much more than my caſe required. Deſirous of completely refuting Mr. Burke's arguments againſt recognizing the Republic of France, I have hitherto admitted the principal facts on which he founds them. But I have admitted a great deal too much. The preſent Government of France is far from being of the infamous character which Mr. Burke deſcribes.

To have negotiated with ſuch infernal monſters as Hebert, Marat, Chaumette and Robeſpierre, might, poſſibly, have been unſafe and diſhonourable to his Majeſty. It might at leaſt be contended that miniſters were in ſome degree excuſable, in being unable to make ſuch a ſacrifice of their feelings to their duty, as ſuch recognition and negotiation would have required. But, this admitted, it would nevertheleſs have been unwiſe and even diſhonourable to have refuſed to negotiate with the members of the Directory; unwiſe for various reaſons beſides thoſe which I have already given; and diſhonourable becauſe it would be falſe and unjuſt to claſs theſe men, inſolent and preſumptuous as they are, with the vile and execrable ruffians, whoſe ſanguinary domination ſo

long

long afflicted France. Some indeed of her preſent rulers were of the number of thoſe ruffians; but they have in ſome meaſure expiated their guilt by reforming their conduct. Tallien, for inſtance, was foremoſt among thoſe who hurled Roberſpierre from his "Throne of Terror," and eſtabliſhed what in compariſon with his rule, is the reign of humanity and mercy. But whatever number of the old may have place in the compoſition of the new Government, there is certainly a very great difference between its ſpirit and character and the ſpirit and character of its predeceſſor. Do we now hear of any thing to remind us of thoſe maſſacres which "cannot be remembered without horror," except the puniſhment of the perpetrators? Do the preſent rulers of France maintain themſelves by proſcriptions, exiles, and confiſcations without number? Do they now carry fire and ſword through La Vendée? Have they not faithfully obſerved the conditions of their agreements with the brave inhabitants of that deſolated territory? Are they not entitled to a portion of our regards for reſtoring liberty to ſuch of our countrymen as the perfidious and puſillanimous tyrant, without right or expediency, had conſigned to his dungeons; for mitigating the captivity of thoſe whoſe impriſonment was unavoidable from the fortune and the laws of war, and for delivering from death the myriads of their own nation, whoſe

blood was ſoon to have diminiſhed the fears or gratified the vengeance of their oppreſſors?

In almoſt every reſpect the ruling perſons of the New Government are diametrically oppoſite to the Jacobin* Faction. They encourage with a zeal that the worſt of their enemies muſt eſteem

* I uſe the word Jacobin, and perhaps correctly, in the ſenſe in which it is now and has been for upwards of two years underſtood in the place where the term originated. To avoid a diſguſting and hideous enumeration of crimes and abſurdities, I define jacobiniſm to be the ſyſtem of politics adopted by the Jacobin Club of Paris from the year 1793 to the time of its deſtruction, and acted upon in various places by Le Bon, Freron, Collot d'Herbois, Carrier, Marat and Robeſpierre. By jacobiniſm I mean that ſyſtem "which drenched France with blood, and inundated it with tears; proſcribed probity, virtue and philoſophy; annihilated commerce, arts and ſciences; honoured vandaliſm and robbery; corrupted moral principle; delegated the power of life and death to the moſt ferocious of men; erected 50,000 baſtiles, and filled them with pretended conſpirators; maſſacred age on its bed of pain; murdered infancy in the mother's womb; violated chaſtity in the moment of death; fatted the monſters of the ocean with human fleſh; changed the Rhone and the Loire to rivers of blood, Vancluſe to a fountain of tears, Nantes to a ſepulchre, Paris, Arras, Bourdeaux, Straſbourg to ſlaughter-houſes, and France to one vaſt theatre of horror, pillage, and murder." When, therefore, I ſpeak of jacobiniſm, I cannot allude to any thing Engliſh. There is nothing in England like it. Inſtead of 80,000 Jacobins I do not believe the country contains one.

laudable,

laudable, the improvement of the arts and ſciences; not thoſe only which adminiſter to the art of war, but all which can ſupply inſtruction or afford delight to men. Their projected eſtabliſhments for the education of youth merit the attention and imitation of every Government in the world. Their manners, ſtill more than their morals, are remote from jacobin uſage. They have laid aſide that barbarous groſſneſs of language which was once eſteemed an eſſential part of the accompliſhmen of a republican, but which no prince would be pleaſed to have addreſſed to his Ambaſſador. The ſqualid and ſordid apparel that was once diſplayed with ſuch ludicrous and groteſque vanity is no longer in the mode of Paris. The miniſters and ſenators of the French Republic have long thought that there is no neceſſary connexion, and indeed nothing congenial, between dirt and patriotiſm; between rags and liberty.—Were your Grace now to viſit Paris in a diplomatic capacity, the benevolence of your mind would not be afflicted with the relation of any but former atrocities; you would not ſee one perſon brought to the guillotine (or as the exterminators facetiouſly expreſſed it, "peeeping through the little national window") for the promulgation of opinions; you would be led into apartments as ſplendid as any in Burlington-houſe; you would be introduced to a gentleman wearing as handſome

robes

robes as your own, who would ſpeak to you politely and call you by your title, without once aſſuring you that your illuſtrious maſter was a crowned robber; that your countrymen were a pack of ſtupid and execrable ſlaves, or that things would never go on well in England until your Grace and all the reſt of our nobility were ſtrangled with the bowels of all our prieſts*, and the management of our affairs confided to ſome worthy gentlemen of Wapping or St. Giles's, whom they in their goodneſs would recommend us to elect. No ſuch inſulting language would be addreſſed to your Grace. Whatever might be the lofty and unreaſonable demands of the Directory, they would not be made in the ſtyle of the Pere Ducheſne. You would be treated as a gentleman and reſpected as the repreſentative of a ſovereign power. You would find among the members of the French Government, ſome men of ſplendid talents and extenſive reputation, whoſe acquaintance it would not diſgrace your Lordſhip or any other perſon in Europe to cultivate.

From this reception of your Grace as ambaſſador to the French Republic, could any diſhonour

* It was a ſaying of one of the Jacobins (I believe of Anacharſis Cloots, ſirnamed the orator of the human race) that no good would be done in the world until the laſt of kings was ſtrangled with the bowels of the laſt of prieſts.

attach to your Grace or your country? Have miniſters merited the bitter cenſures of Mr. Burke for adviſing his Majeſty to recognize that republic? In its preſent circumſtances would not they have been inexcuſable if they had ſtill refuſed to recognize it?

Some are of opinion that his Majeſty's Miniſters would have acted unwiſely and ignominiouſly, if they had made any treaty with the French nation whilſt it was ſubject to the dominion of the jacobin club. They who maintain this opinion frequently argue thus: "The Jacobin Government of France was compoſed of men who were not likely, (any ſet of them) according to fair probabilities, to enjoy their power or even their lives for ſix weeks; who, if guillotined, would moſt probably have been ſucceeded by others that would act upon a new political ſyſtem, regardleſs of the engagements of their predeceſſors or the faith of their nation; and who, if continued, and extraordinary acts of wickedneſs had prolonged their tyranny, were ſuch fickle and perfidious barbarians that no good conjecture could have been made of their own future political meaſures, and no fair hope entertained that they would remain faithful to their own engagements any longer than it ſuited their convenience or caprice:—To have made peace with France, in theſe circumſtances, would have been

been inſanity; We could not have expected that the greedy ruffians by whom ſhe was governed, would have been able to reſiſt long the temptation of the rich booty which our extenſive commerce would have continually offered to their view, and frequently placed within their graſp; or even that they would have delayed the renewal of hoſtilities beyond the firſt opportunity of capturing one of our commercial fleets. Peace in theſe circumſtances might have been much more detrimental to us than war. The war eſtabliſhment muſt have been kept up, unleſs we had been willing to have truſted the ſafety of our wealthy empire to the mercy and good faith of the moſt mercileſs and perfidious, or to the imbecility of the moſt powerful banditti that ever oppreſſed or afflicted mankind. Our expence would therefore have been nearly as great during a Jacobin peace as in war, without yielding to us any return in conqueſts or booty, and our loſs by captures might have been much greater in conſequence of having made peace than if the war had been continued. The confidence which is always inſpired by a treaty of peace, would have made our merchants venture their property upon the ocean without the protection which they would have required in war; and through this confidence the Jacobin pirates might have made richer captures, after a ſhort interval of peace, than they could have made in a year,

had there been no interruption of war. To have concluded a peace with theſe vile banditti, without humbling or puniſhing them, would have been as ignominious as unwiſe: for they conſtantly laviſhed upon his Majeſty (the repreſentative to foreign nations of the dignity of our own) the fouleſt and groſſeſt reproaches: and if his Majeſty, inſtead of being an ornament to the moſt ſplendid throne in the world, had been the vileſt of men, he was ſtill the King whom the Engliſh people ſupported and obeyed, and they would have been baſe and puſillanimous if they had ſuffered him to be inſulted with impunity, ſince their own dignity and conſequence, in the eyes of foreign States, were centered in his perſon. To repreſs this confederacy was the intereſt of the majority of every country. That confederacy openly avowed their deſign, not merely to change forms of Government, but to aſſiſt the deſperate and wicked few of every country in plundering and enſlaving all the reſt. It was peculiarly our intereſt to repreſs Jacobiniſm, and if poſſible annihilate its ſpirit, if we felt any affection for the portion of democracy which we enjoyed. True Jacobin principles which might poſſibly have gained a footing in this iſland if we had made peace with France whilſt they were triumphant, are moſt averſe to democratic principles. The Jacobin Government was a confederation of Oligarchies. Its powers were

chiefly

chiefly exerciſed by the Jacobin Club, the great oligarchy of the city of Paris, ſupported by the deſperate energy of the clubs or oligarchies that were eſtabliſhed in every part of France. Free election was unknown. The trial by jury, the liberty of ſpeech and of the preſs, privileges watched with ſuch jealouſy by the democracy of England, were annihilated. Talents, virtues and reputation, which are idolized in almoſt every democracy, were capital crimes during the Jacobin uſurpation. None of the characteriſtics of democracy were to be found in this Government. It abhorred and dreaded real democrats above all others. Every claſs of perſons in this country, and above all the republicans, the advocates for popular ſovereignty, were intereſted in deſtroying the power and influence of the Jacobin Government. That the continuance of the war occaſioned events which accelerated its fall, and rendered more complete the deſtruction of its principles, no one can ſeriouſly doubt. If peace would have ſuffered it to continue for any conſiderable length of time, and peace might have had this effect ſince it would not have permitted the atrocious acts by which the Jacobins ruined themſelves, then France and England, and every country in Europe, but France more than all, ſhould rejoice that hoſtilities were not interrupted.—But we were at peace with Algiers, whoſe

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Government was as abominable and infamous as the Jacobin Government of France; admitted. But the governors of Algiers had not arrived at Jacobin inſolence. They had not publiſhed through the world that his Majeſty was a crowned robber or a royal butcher. They were not poſſeſſed of ſufficient impudence to reproach others with their own crimes. Robbers they were, indeed, and miniſters acknowledged them as a lawful Government. But although theſe miniſters were willing to ſpeak civilly to the miſchievous dwarf, whoſe puniſhment would have coſt the country much trouble without affording any great advantage or renown, they diſdained to flatter the inſulting giant, from whom if more danger were to be apprehend, more glory was to be won."

With whatever force ſuch arguments as theſe might have been urged againſt treating for peace with France during the deſpotiſm of the Jacobin oligarchy, not one of them will bear application to France in her preſent circumſtances. The actual Government of France has given, during upwards of two years paſt, as good proof of its ſtability and permanency as ought to be required of any Government in any times, particularly in ſuch times of change and uncertainty as theſe. That Government adheres ſteadily to one ſyſtem;

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and has aſſumed a reſpectable, although a haughty character. It utters no groſs and vulgar invectives againſt the perſons of any kings, or againſt any forms of government; it has abandoned the deſtructive deſign of impoſing its own political principles upon all other nations, and is as inveterately the enemy of Jacobin principles as any Government in Europe.

Although the negotiations for peace are unfortunately broken off, our formal recognition of the French Republic will be attended with conſiderable advantages to us. Our conduct has proved to the people of France that we have no intention of meddling in their internal affairs; no deſign of preſcribing to them any mode of religion, or any form of Government. We have not merely acknowledged the actual Government of France, as we might have done although we at the ſame time meditated or prepared for its deſtruction; We have recognized, moſt fully and formally, the ſyſtem on which it is founded. We have by this meaſure declared our acquieſcence in the French Revolution. We have diſclaimed that our purpoſe in continuing the war is the reſtoration of the French monarchy. We have informed the people of France that as far as we are concerned their political ſyſtem is ſafe. They may certainly reſt aſſured that his Majeſty will never be guilty of

of the inconſiſtency and duplicity of retracting what he has once publicly ſaid, and of acting in violation of what he has done, ſolemnly and in the preſence of the whole world. The French Republic being thus ſecurely eſtabliſhed, the tremendous enthuſiaſm of the French people, which aroſe out of the attempts to prevent them from eſtabliſhing a Republican Government, will be damped if not deſtroyed. It cannot long exiſt in its full vigor after the cauſes to which it owed its origin have ceaſed to operate. This main ſpring of the martial proſperity and glory of the French Republic, derived all its ſtrength from the magnitude of the dangers that threatened her exiſtence, and cannot retain its priſtine force after the formal recognition of her authority by all her enemies. The zeal of her people muſt be conſiderably abated when they are no longer menaced with a form of Government which they deteſt, and when this recognition muſt make them feel ſecure of the eſtabliſhment of the ſyſtem of Government which they have ſpilled ſo much of their blood to maintain. The enemy can now continue the war for no other objects than extenſion of territory, and of commerce; objects that a whole people can never be made to purſue with the ſame enthuſiaſm which they would diſplay in defence of their national independence, or of a favorite political ſyſtem. His Majeſty's wiſdom in acknowledging the

the French Republic may not only abate her enthuſiaſm, but rouſe and animate the whole Engliſh nation. The ſame cauſes that occaſioned in France thoſe mighty exertions that have no parallel in the hiſtory of the world, would operate I truſt in Great Britain with equal power. If it ſhould ever appear that our enemies proſecute the war for the purpoſe of deſtroying our ſovereign independence, or of ſubverting any religious or political eſtabliſhment that we wiſh to maintain, or impoſing upon us any ſyſtems or eſtabliſhments that we abominate, I truſt there would ſpring up amongſt us a national enthuſiaſm of ſuch fervor and energy, as to juſtify the expectation that our exertions would even ſurpaſs the hitherto unexampled exertions of the enemy.

If miniſters followed the advice of Mr. Burke, in never acknowledging the French Republic, we could never proſecute the war againſt her with enthuſiaſm, nor would her zeal againſt us ever be diminiſhed. The ſpirit of the people of England would be deadened by the opinion, which it would be impoſſible to prevent them from entertaining, that their blood and treaſure were waſted to gratify the obſtinate pride of their Government, and the ſpirit of the people of France would be buoyed up to its higheſt pitch by the conſideration which

 their

their rulers would continually preſs, that our refuſal to acknowledge their Government was evidence of a project for its deſtruction.

The mode in which we have recognized the French Republic appears to Mr. Burke imprudent, and not juſtified by any example*. "I doubt" ſays he "upon mere temporary conſiderations of "prudence whether it (the formal recognition of "that State) was perfectly adviſable. It is not "within the rules of dexterous conduct to make "an acknowledgment of a conteſted title in your "enemy, before you are morally certain that "your recognition will ſecure his friendſhip. "Otherwiſe it is a meaſure worſe than thrown "away. It adds infinitely to the ſtrength and "conſequently to the demands of the adverſe "party. He has gained a fundamental point "without an equivalent †."

In the unconditional recognition of the French Republic, miniſters were perfectly authoriſed by the example of the American war. The United States of America were recognized in the firſt inſtance and without ſtipulation, condition or equivalent by a miniſter whom Mr. Burke then

* Page 36. † Ibid.

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ſupported*. But the unconditional acknowledgment of the French Republic is certainly a meaſure of much clearer propriety. In recognizing our late colonies as Sovereign States, his Majeſty relinquiſhed an undoubted claim of his own, and attributed to them a title to ſovereign power, which, according to the eſtabliſhed law of nations, this recognition was abſolutely neceſſary to render complete. Previous to it, the formal

* The following paſſage is extracted from a ſpeech of Mr. Burke's, as it appears in Debrett's Report of one of the Debates of the Houſe of Commons on our acknowledgment of the United States of America.

"There were three opinions in this country on the great and "important queſtion of American independence; they might "each of them appear reaſonable and upright; he would not "pretend to decide upon either of them. The firſt of the three "was that independence to America under any conſiderations or "conditions was a real misfortune to this nation. This idea "might prevail with ſome men of every deſcription in that "houſe; and he was ſorry that it conſiſted of thoſe of all "deſcriptions. He ſhould not pretend to refute it. The next "was that independence ought not to be granted to America "without an equivalent of ſome nature or other as the price of "peace, or for ſomething beneficial to this country. The laſt "was that it ſhould be given up without any conſideration of any "ſort, that the recognition of it by this country ſhould be free "and unlimited. *Amongſt the laſt claſs was himſelf* and his "friend."

Vide Debrett's Parl. Reg. Vol. IX, page 79, 80.

acknowledgment of the American States by any other power would have amounted to a declaration of hoſtilities againſt his Majeſty. In recognizing the French Republic his Majeſty has relinquiſhed no claim of his own, nor has he attributed to that State any title, rank or authority which would not have been complete and acknowledged by other powers without his recognition. How has it added to the ſtrength or the demands of the enemy? It has indeed given him an aſſurance that we do not war againſt his independence; but it has given nothing more. It has added, not to his, but to our ſtrength. It will place us in any future negotiation on higher, becauſe on juſter grounds. We had no more right to demand from the enemy an equivalent for our recognition of his ſyſtem of Government than he had to demand of the abſolute Princes, our allies, a compenſation for recognizing their ſovereign rights when he repealed his decrees of fraternity. Are we ſure that the Directory would not have ſmiled in deriſion if they had been ſerioufly aſked by our ambaſſador how much they were willing to give his Majeſty as an equivalent for recognizing the French Republic? As an equivalent, they might have ſaid, for acknowledging the exiſtence of a State that had made almoſt all her enemies tremble for their own.

Between

Between independent nations, the only ſort of equivalent that can be reaſonably expected for the acknowledgment of one title is, the acknowledgment of ſome other. If two States quarrel, and if each refuſes to recognize the title which the other has aſſumed, it would not be conſiſtent with the dignity of either of them to yield the point of title to the adverſary, without being firſt aſſured of receiving from him a ſimilar conceſſion. If the Government of France had refuſed to acknowledge his Majeſty as King of Great Britain, miniſters would have been blameable in recognizing their authority without demanding as an equivalent the formal acknowledgment of his Majeſty's title. But as they have never denied it, there was nothing that we could have juſtly demanded from them in return for the recognition which his Majeſty has made.

The next of the propoſitions in which I have endeavoured to include the ſubſtance of Mr. Burke's letters is, "that if we make peace with the preſent Government of France, this country will not long be able to preſerve her religion, property, conſtitution or laws, and that the whole ſyſtem of religion, laws, government, uſages, morals and manners now eſtabliſhed in Europe will be deſtroyed."

It is extraordinary that the apprehenſions which were at one time entertained from the revolutionary principle, ſhould ſtill remain in any man's mind undiminiſhed, ſince they have not been juſtified by a ſingle event. Not one revolution has been effected in the world ſince the revolution in France, by the mere force or faſcination of her principles. The revolution in Poland had no connexion with them, and it is notorious that the change of Government which has taken place in the Netherlands, the United Provinces, Savoy, and in ſome parts of Germany and Italy, was effected chiefly, if not altogether, by the armies of France. Even the revolution in Geneva is much leſs imputable to French doctrines, than to French power and French gold. All theſe were found inſufficient, during the Jacobin reign, to produce a revolution in the feeble republic of Genoa, not to mention the republics of Venice and the American States. But ſurely the danger that was not then fatal to Venice or Genoa, can never be formidable to the Britiſh Empire. It is fair to preſume at leaſt that the fears of many perſons from the operation of the revolutionary principle are too great, ſince experience has not yet confirmed them in any one inſtance, and in one only if the Republic of Geneva furniſhes an exception to my propoſition.

Mr.

Mr. Burke is apprehenſive for the ſafety of the Chriſtian religion, becauſe France, as he aſſerts, is governed by fanatical Atheiſts, who have made "atheiſm by eſtabliſhment" one of the baſes of the French Republic.

Atheiſm cannot juſtly be ſaid to be eſtabliſhed by any State, unleſs it is profeſſed by that State, or by its repreſentative in ſome ſolemn declaration. To neglect acknowledging the exiſtence of God, is not to *eſtabliſh* atheiſm. The word eſtabliſhment implies ſome poſitive regulation. Far from having made atheiſm one of their eſtabliſhments, the Legiſlators of the French Republic have recognized the exiſtence and the providence of the Supreme Being, in their moſt ſolemn act and in the moſt ſolemn language. The very firſt paragraph of the firſt and moſt important chapter of their Conſtitution, the declaration of rights and duties, is dedicated to this acknowledgment. It is made in the following words: "The French "people proclaim, in the *preſence* of the SUPREME "BEING, the following declaration of the rights "and duties of man and of a citizen." In addition to this ſolemn recognition of the fundamental principle of religion, the ſame declaration aſſerts, that "no man is a good man if he is not frankly "and *religiouſly* an obſerver of the laws;" and what is ſtill more important and deciſive, the 354th article

article of the Conſtitution provides that "no man "can be hindered from *exerciſing the form of* "*worſhip* that he has choſen, whilſt he conforms "to the laws." Thus the French Legiſlators have eſtabliſhed atheiſm, by making a ſolemn acknowledgment of the exiſtence and providence of the Deity, the preliminary to their conſtitutional law, and by ſecuring in the moſt forcible and irrevocable proviſion they had power to make, the right of every man to acknowledge and adore that Being, in whatever mode, and with whatever rites and ceremonies his conſcience might ſuggeſt. If atheiſm is eſtabliſhed in the French Republic it is alſo eſtabliſhed in the Republic of America. No particular form of worſhip is maintained in either of thoſe States at the public expence.

Were atheiſm actually made one of the baſes of the French Republic, we ſhould juſtly regard her with horror, and account the ignorance, ingratitude and mental abaſement of her Legiſlators as degrading to human nature. Their conduct would be too deteſtable to be contagious. Of all vicious opinions, atheiſm contains the leaſt infection. It holds out no temptations: it preſents no object for hope, the univerſal paſſion: it is a melancholy ſubterfuge from fear. There are few who would not fly for refuge into the arms of the vileſt and groſſeſt ſuperſtition rather than encounter the terrors

terrors of annihilation by embracing the Atheiſt's creed.

It is unfortunate for the credit of Mr. Burke that he continually accuſes the revolutioniſts of crimes which are incompatible with each other. He not only refuſes to allow that they poſſeſs any virtue, but he will not admit that they are free from any vice. Thoſe whom in one place he reproaches with *atheiſm*, with denying the exiſtence of God, he accuſes in another of being "*rebels to God*," of perfectly abhorring the author of their being, of hating him with all their heart, with all their mind, with all their ſoul, with all their ſtrength; of having a delight, as they are not able to revenge themſelves on God, in vicariouſly defacing, degrading, torturing and tearing in pieces his image in man*. Such accuſations are not only unworthy of the enlightened philoſopher Edmund Burke, but they would be too coarſe, blaſphemous, extravagant and diſguſting to be made by John Bunian or Rowland Hill.

It cannot be pleaſing to the ſincere Chriſtian to hear how Mr. Burke explains his apprehenſions for the fate of Chriſtianity. "Example," ſays he, "is the ſchool of mankind and they will learn

* Page, 161.

" at no other. This war is a war againſt that " example. It is not a war for Louis XVIII. or " even for the property, virtue, fidelity of France: " It is a war for George III. for Francis II. " and for all the dignity, property, honor, virtue " and religion of England, of Germany and of all " Nations." Is then, the Chriſtian religion, like all the ſuperſtitions that now exiſt among the barbarous, nations and thoſe that were prevalent in the antient world, learnt only from example; believed only becauſe others believe it, and publicly embraced by us only becauſe it is eſtabliſhed? Is it ſo feeble, ſo entirely dependant upon human circumſtances that it can be overthrown by any example whatever? If it were even deſtitute of the divine protection, its very nature, as an intellectual ſyſtem, would ſecure it from being deſtroyed by force or by mere example. It is a religion of the mind; a religion of opinions, doctrines and precepts: It teaches rights and duties; it arreſts and keeps poſſeſſion of the mind by hope and terror: its temples are the heart and the underſtanding: it therefore can not be mortally aſſaulted (admitting it to be a mere human ſyſtem) except with intellectual weapons. The religions of antiquity had no ſolid foundation in the mind: they were therefore capable of being deſtroyed by force or by example. When the Temples and Prieſts of an heathen deity were deſtroyed, his worſhip, conſiſting entirely

of

of ceremonies, to the performance of which temples and Prieſts were neceſſary, muſt ſoon have ceaſed, and his votaries have been compelled to find another object of adoration. It was on this account that the ancient ſuperſtitions were ſo eaſily and ſo completely exterminated. But the Chriſtian religion was never yet deſtroyed in any country where it had once firmly taken root; where it had ever been generally known and embraced as a ſyſtem of opinions, and not as a ſyſtem of external rites. In ſpite of the ſword and the oppreſſive tribute; in ſpite of tyranny, inſolence and contempt; in ſpite of perſecutions, impriſonments, robberies, baniſhments, diſgrace, ſlavery and death; in a word, in ſpite of the whole force and the example of the Mahometan Governments of Aſia, exerted during a long period with fanatical fury and perſeverance for the deſtruction of our religion, it is ſtill, and during all that period was the popular religion in moſt of the countries then and at this time ſubject to the Mahometan ſway; and it would probably have now been equally prevalent in China, in Japan and in other Eaſtern Nations, if it had been introduced amongſt them in its true intellectual ſhape, and not as a collection of ceremonies, which phyſical power could always deſtroy. Can we reaſonably apprehend that the mere example of France will operate more powerfully to the detriment of the Chriſtian religion on the minds of the free, indepen-

dent, bold, obſtinate Engliſhmen, than force and example, fire and ſword, tribute and ignominy have ever done upon the minds of the feeble, timid and enſlaved Aſiatics?

If any formidable attack can be made againſt our religion, it muſt be made with argument, or with ſomething that reſembles argument. During the laſt and the preſent centuries, ſuch attacks were often made; but they were always vigorouſly repulſed. In France indeed they were more ſucceſsful than in any part of Europe; and there they were undoubtedly aſſiſted by the revolution. But in England and in moſt of the other countries of Europe, the Chriſtian church is now militant very nearly in the ſame poſture in which ſhe would have ſtood if the French revolution had not happened. I truſt we ſhall never form our opinions concerning the Chriſtian religion from what has happened, or what may happen in France or in any other country, but from its merit as a moral ſyſtem, and from the evidence tranſmitted to us by our anceſtors of its divine original.

The property of this country has as little to dread as her religion from the infection of French principles, or the influence of French example. Many and unjuſt confiſcations were made within our view, before the era of the French revolution, with-

without diſturbing the rights of property. I ſhould not indeed apprehend any danger to property in this country, if the Jabobin confiſcations ſtill continued, and if daily robberies and murders were now perpetrated in France as they were during Robeſpierre's tyranny. I truſt we ſhould view them with the deepeſt abhorrence, and that in place of exciting us to ſimilar guilt, they would render us more zealous in the protection of property and life.

Robbery and murder have not much more power of faſcinating the maſs of mankind than atheiſm. Many indeed may wiſh, although few will have the ſhameleſs audacity to declare, that they are willing to imitate the ſucceſsful plunderer. But no extenſive robbery, ſuch as Mr. Burke apprehends, can ever be committed without a very extenſive combination, and a full declaration and confeſſion of the views of the combining parties. I am perſuaded it would not be poſſible to find within this kingdom, granting liberal permiſſion to canvaſs, ſuch a number of men as would be ſufficient to deſtroy the rights of property, who would alſo be inclined to do ſo, and barefaced enough to avow their guilty inclination. I have a better opinion of the people of England than Mr. Burke. I do not believe they are ſo prone to plundering, that they only want the

revival

revival of Jacobiniſm in France to make them begin their depredations.

Property ſeems perfectly ſecure in England, becauſe a great majority of the people are intereſted and believe themſelves to be intereſted in its preſervation. There is hardly an Engliſhman, poſſeſſed of a cottage or an acre of land, who does not know that he would be in danger of loſing the cottage or the land if his wealthy neighbour could be plundered with impunity.

Whatever may be the operation of foreign example upon Great Britain, and whatever example, unfavorable to the rights of property, France may have hitherto given, ſhe does not now, and probably will not in future, afford any farther encouragement to unlawful confiſcation. Her rulers, having acquired for themſelves and the State, ſo much of the wealth of the proſcribed orders, will naturally endeavour to render it ſecure. But it can poſſeſs no ſecurity except what it enjoys in common with all other property. If confiſcations were ſtill encouraged or permitted, it would be impoſſible to reſtrain the depredations of the confiſcators to particular portions of property. The confiſcators of France and thoſe who claim under their acts, ſhould be uncommonly ſtrict in ſecuring to every man his poſſeſſions. They ſhould com-

compenſate for the doubtfulneſs of their own titles by a rigorous ſupport of all titles whatever. On Mr. Burke's ſuppoſition that all their confiſcations have been acts of robbery, they muſt conſider that they are liable to have their own example turned againſt themſelves; they muſt therefore be careful that no future robbery however minute may be unpuniſhed; and they muſt watch with unceaſing vigilance, and oppoſe with the moſt rigorous ſeverity any attempts, however feeble, at eſtabliſhing any new ſyſtem of plundering on a large ſcale. He would be a highwayman of wretched intellects who, having acquired a handſome fortune by his depredations, ſhould ſuffer his zeal for his profeſſion ſo far to get the better of his prudence, as to make him encourage depredations in future. If he were not miſerably ignorant of his own intereſt, he would wiſh that no more robberies ſhould ever be committed in the world; he would adviſe in oppoſition to the Jacobin doctrine that all titles to property ſhould be maintained, without looking too minutely or too far back into their origin; and he would admire above all things the anti-revolutionary principle of our ſtatute of limitations.

Whatever the cauſe of it may be, the fact is, that ſince the death of Robeſpierre few confiſcations have been made in France, except what were

made

made moſt juſtly of the property of many of his accomplices. Judicial robbery, like judicial murder, can never long be an eſtabliſhed ſyſtem in a country where the voice of the people is heard. In France indeed it formed the chief part of the ſyſtem of Robeſpierre's Government during many months. But as every one living began to think himſelf intereſted in the ceſſation of judicial murder, ſo every one that poſſeſſed any property, and chiefly all thoſe who poſſeſſed the confiſcated property, began to wiſh that no more judicial robberies ſhould be committed. Oppoſition to the general will was vain, and the cauſe of juſtice and humanity was triumphant.

The apprehenſion that the eſtabliſhment of the French Republic will endanger the ſafety of our conſtitution, I take to be wholly unfounded. The form of the new French Conſtitution, and the leading principles on which it is eſtabliſhed, have a ſtrong reſemblance to the form and the leading principles of the Conſtitution of Great Britain; and the whole hiſtory of France ſince her revolution affords very ſpecious if not triumphant arguments to the advocates of thoſe principles. In addition to the teſtimony that experience had given in their favor, previous to the fall of the French monarchy, it has ſince furniſhed more convincing proofs of their merit, at which their admirers might

might rejoice if thoſe proofs had not been drawn from human ſufferings.

There was indeed a period during the progreſs of the French Revolution, when there was perhaps, ſome reaſon to fear that the faſcinating novelty of the principles then prevalent in France might ſhake thoſe on which our Conſtitution is built. Even at that time many perſons of good information held the danger light. They ſuppoſed that the principles of our Conſtitution were rooted, like thoſe of religion, in our minds; and that no principles of Government however ſhewy or ſplendid, and no example of their effect on the condition of any foreign nation, could induce the people of this Iſland to adopt them in preference to the political principles which they had ſo long loved and revered, and to which their attachment would be rendered invincible by inveterate prejudice and national vanity. But the French revolution has neither exhibited any events nor eſtabliſhed any ſyſtem that could deſtroy the principles of our Conſtitution, if inſtead of being zealouſly attached to them, we were determined to maintain them no longer than till France ſhould ſupply us with new ones.

In the firſt period of that revolution, the French Legiſlators formed a Conſtitution which veſted the

 execu-

executive power in a King, and the legiſlative in that King and one aſſembly. In form and principles this Conſtitution differed widely from ours. It laſted but a ſhort time, and was followed by another that was founded on principles of the wideſt democracy, and that differed ſtill more than its predeceſſor from our political ſyſtem, the legiſlative authority being entruſted to one aſſembly, and the executive power to a council that was entirely dependent on its caprice. Although this Conſtitution was not put into activity, France had a tolerable ſpecimen of what it might have been from the Convention, which exerciſed the powers of Government, nearly in the ſame manner that it would have done if it had been the Legiſlative Aſſembly of Robeſpierre's Conſtitution. Every thing happened that the advocate of the principles of our Conſtitution would point out as likely to take place when the legiſlative and executive functions are exerciſed by one uncontrouled aſſembly. Laws were decreed and repealed with precipitation and caprice; the leaſt oppoſition to the prevailing party was puniſhed as treaſon againſt the State; the freedom of ſpeech and of the preſs was deſtroyed; in a word tyranny was exerciſed in every ſhape. At length have the revolutioniſts of France, who from the year 1792, ſet out with enthuſiaſtic attachment to abſolute unlimited, unreſtricted democracy; with abhorrence

to the principle that property ſhould be an eſſential part of the qualification for ſuffrage; with contempt for our Conſtitution in all its parts; our two legiſlative aſſemblies; our vigorous and ſplendid executive power; our reſtriction of the right of ſuffrage; at length have theſe enthuſiaſts abandoned all their old political theories, and recognized the leading principles, and adopted the chief forms of the Engliſh Conſtitution. Like us they have limited the right of ſuffrage; they have eſtabliſhed two legiſlative aſſemblies, Tribunals that are independent, and a vigorous and ſplendid executive power. Can any thing be more favorable or more flattering to our Conſtitution than thus to have its leading principles adopted, through conviction of their expediency, by their greateſt enemies?

On a cloſe examination of the Conſtitution, with the framers of which his Majeſty was adviſed to negotiate, it appears not only to be founded on principles congenial to thoſe of the Engliſh Conſtitution, but to be framed throughout as nearly in the ſame ſhape as the hatred of France to her old Government, and various other circumſtances would permit. In ſome inſtances the reſtrictions of the right of ſuffrage, both in reſpect to age and property, are more numerous and more ſevere in the new French Conſtitution than in ours. No French Citizen has the right of voting for a mem-

ber of either of the Legiſlative Councils, unleſ he is 25 years of age, and is in poſſeſſion of a property equivalent in ſome diſtricts to ſeven pounds, and in others to fourteen pounds ſterling per annum. The Legiſlative authority is veſted in two councils, or houſes according to our phraſe. Citizens under the age of 40 years are excluded from the Council of Ancients, and after the ſeventh year of the Republic, no perſon under the age of 30 years will be competent to be a member of the Council of Five Hundred.

This qualification excludes from the Legiſlature an immenſe portion of the democracy. By our laws twenty one years give the age of competency for a ſeat in either Houſe of Parliament. The French Conſtitution does not indeed require the Legiſlators to poſſeſs conſiderable property: But it is not likely that the electors, who muſt themſelves have property, will chooſe for repreſentatives men who have none; that they will veſt legiſlative power with thoſe whoſe neceſſities might tempt them to make too free with the purſes of their conſtitutents. I think it may be fairly preſumed that the operation of all theſe qualifications, particularly the qualification of age, will give to the future Government of the French Republic a ſober, ſerious and ſteady character; a character incompatible with a diſpoſition to encourage wild and wicked revolutionary projects.

The

The French Conſtitution has given the executive authority to a council of five perſons, who are veſted with high powers and cloathed with little leſs than regal ſplendor. This council, called the Executive Directory, ſuperintends the execution of the laws, the receipt and expenditure of the public money, and the miniſtry of all the municipal bodies: It diſpoſes of the armed force by ſea and land, receives Ambaſſadors, negotiates treaties, propoſes peace and war, appoints and diſmiſſes at pleaſure all the miniſters, generals, and a great number of the other public functionaries: it has its guards, its meſſengers of State and its uſhers.—(Their dreſs would in ſome countries entitle them to be called *gentlemen uſhers.*) Its members are lodged in ſplendid Palaces, arrayed in robes of State, addreſſed in the moſt reſpectful language, and received with the higheſt military honors. Its relation to the Legiſlative Aſſemblies bears a ſtrong reſemblance to that which exiſts in practice between his Majeſty and both Houſes of Parliament. If the Directory have no legiſlative voice, his Majeſty never exerts the legiſlative authority beſtowed upon him by our Conſtitution, but in ſanctioning the decrees of our two Legiſlative Aſſemblies. The Directory have not the full power of declaring war. It can not be declared but by a decree of the Legiſlative Body upon the formal propoſition of the Directory*,

* Article 526 of the new French Conſtitution.

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With us the ſame forms are obſerved; for although the Royal Prerogative authoriſes his Majeſty to declare war in the firſt inſtance, he is always pleaſed to ſend a meſſuage to both Houſes of Parliament, whenever he thinks that war is neceſſary, and without their approbation and concurrence he never engages the country in any conteſt whatever. Treaties made by the executive Directory with Foreign powers are not valid until they are ratified by the Legiſlature. His Majeſty can indeed by virtue of his prerogative make treaties to bind his ſubjects; but the ſame gracious regard to the wiſhes and opinions of the Nation, that he always manifeſts previous to a declaration of war, never ſuffers him to conclude any treaty, until his Miniſters, having felt the pulſe of Parliament, can aſſure him that the treaty will meet with its approbation. In ſome circumſtances, apparently of no great importance, our political modes are exactly copied by the Republican Legiſlators. They have conſtructed the very galleries of their aſſemblies in conformity with ours. What the diſcretion of the ſpeakers of our Houſes of Parliament has obſerved in the admiſſion of auditors into thoſe aſſemblies, has been adopted in France, and ſecured with the force and ſolemnity of a conſtitutional article*.

* Article 64 provides that the ſittings of both Councils ſhall be public; but that the perſons who attend can not exceed the number of one half of the members of each Council.

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This is the political ſyſtem, (excellent, I hope ſince it reſembles our own) which Mr. Burke preſumes to call *Jacobiniſm by eſtabliſhment*.—This is the form of the Government that he has the effrontery to repreſent as a tumultuous military tyranny, and to compare,(but not without diſparagement,) to the ſavage, ſanguinary, and piratical deſpotiſm of Algiers. Is it poſſible that a State which has formed its Government on the model of the freeſt, wiſeſt, and moſt moderate Government that until lately exiſted in the world, can merit the epithets, bloody, impious, abominable, perfidious?

I ſhould have expected that Mr. Burke, inſtead of continuing to laviſh invectives againſt the French Republic, would have beheld the eſtabliſhment of her new Conſtitution with exultation, and that he would have triumphantly deſired us to remark, how ſoon thoſe Democrats who had iſſued flaming from the ſchool of Rouſſeau, Paine and Barlow had been compelled to abandon the maxims of their preceptors; to give up their univerſal ſuffrage, their ſingle Legiſlative Aſſembly, their feeble and dependent executive, with other important points of high democracy. I ſhould have thought that Mr. Burke would not have ceaſed to urge the ſuperiority of thoſe principles of Government, whoſe advantages, he might ſay, had in two years overcome the prejudices of a numerous people,

the enthuſiaſm of the moſt enthuſiaſtic advocates of democracy, and the ſelf-ſufficiency and arrogance of the moſt ſelf-ſufficient and arrogant of men, the French philoſophers: I ſhould have expected that thoſe philoſophers would no longer have been obnoxious to his general and indiſcriminate abuſe; that whatever he might have ſtill thought of their religious opinions, he would have been pleaſed, at their recovery from their political delirium, and that he would have congratulated them on having abandoned the guidance of imagination for the directions of ſober judgment, and on having founded their Conſtitution not upon the illuſions of theory, but upon the ſolid baſe of experience.

I confeſs, that as far as I could allow myſelf to judge, I was pleaſed at the eſtabliſhment of that Conſtitution. Far from conſidering it as a Jacobin Conſtitution, I regarded it as a fabric built upon the tomb of Jacobiniſm, and hoped that it would for ever prevent the reſurrection of that abominable ſyſtem. The diviſion and accurate diſcrimination of all the great powers of Government; the independency of the Tribunals; the two Legiſlative Aſſemblies; the ſtrength of the Executive Authority; the ſevere qualifications of age: all theſe proviſions ſeemed to me of peculiar utility in a Conſtitution intended for the French nation; to curb its flights,

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to correct its levity; to moderate the violence of its paſſions; to reſtrain its raſh precipitation; to protect unpopular minorities from the rage of the multitude; in ſhort to prevent for ever the revival of thoſe wild, extravagant, monſtrous and deſpotic meaſures that were purſued by the Convention and that might have been adopted, perhaps in a leſs atrocious extent, if the Jacobin Conſtitution of 1793 had been firmly eſtabliſhed. Some of thoſe monſtrous meaſures were, in my opinion, not more ruinous to France than terrible to Great Britain. As a Britiſh ſubject I therefore rejoiced at the eſtabliſhment of that form of Government in France which would not permit ſuch meaſures to be reſumed.

The new Government of France has conducted itſelf as differently from its immediate predeceſſor, ever ſince it was put into action according to the proviſions of the new Conſtitution, as to juſtify fully the expectations I had formed of the advantages of its ſtructure. Some circumſtances, it muſt be obſerved, have rendered thoſe proviſions much leſs efficacious than they will be after the lapſe of a few years. The qualification of 30 years of age will not be required in the members of the Council of Five Hundred before the year 1799. This circumſtance can have but little influence on the character of the French Govern-

ment, compared with the influence of the memorable decree for the re-election of the two-thirds of the Convention into the two Legiſlative Aſſemblies. Few will heſitate to admit that the predominance of the conventional members in the compoſition of the new Government is unfavorable to its moral character, and that it will probably have a ſtronger claim to our eſteem, when the good ſenſe of the people, and the proviſions of the Conſtitution ſhall have expelled from the Legiſlature every September Aſſaſſin, and every accomplice in the crimes of Robeſpierre.

Notwithſtanding the decree of the two-thirds, the proviſions of the new Conſtitution, aided by other cauſes, have completely changed the ſpirit and character of the French Government*. It is no

* I have ſometimes ſuppoſed that the decree of the two-thirds, like many other violent meaſures, was not altogether deſtitute of utility. If the people of France had been left perfectly free to chooſe their new Government, they would probably have elected Legiſlators whoſe very firſt legiſlative act might have been a decree of vengeance againſt moſt of their predeceſſors, and all the ſupporters of the Jacobin ſyſtem. To puniſh their enormities would undoubtedly have been juſt; but rigid juſtice is not always expedient. The Jacobins were a numerous, united and vindictive confederacy, who, if rendered deſperate by loſing all hope of pardon, might have again thrown their country into diſorder and diſtraction, and have retaliated on their enemies by further maſſa-

no longer tyrannical and deſpotic, becauſe it is no longer of a ſimple form and uncontrouled. The courts of juſtice are independent, and France is not deſolated by thoſe murdering gangs, the Revolutionary Tribunals: No proconſular tyrants ſcourge the departments: No ſyſtem of robbery is eſtabliſhed or propoſed; nor is there any more encouragement given to robbery or revolt in the countries that are at peace with the Republic than in

maſſacres and aſſaſſinations. To repreſs theſe would have required more frequent and more terrible executions, which would have occaſioned more frequent and more aggravated acts of vindictive atrocity. Thus might France have been for many years a ſcene of executions, maſſacres, and rancorous civil contentions. For the ſake of all Europe I deprecate ſuch events. We know from experience, that the hoſtility of France will be ſavage and deſtructive in proportion as her Government is ſanguinary and tyrannical, and as her people are made ferocious by being familiarized with robberies, maſſacres, aſſaſſinations, executions, and all the other dreadful accompanyments of civil war. By the decree of the two-thirds the great body of the Jacobins have been protected from popular fury, and the people themſelves may have been ſaved from the dreadful retaliation of Jacobin deſpair. A ceſſation is thus given to the mutual vengeance and retribution of parties. The Government, being purified by ſucceſſive elections, will recede gradually from what it has been; and by the time that the legiſlative influence of the conventional members will have ceaſed, the violence of their enemies will be aſſuaged, their crimes will be remembered with leſs horror, and their Jacobin ſupporters will no longer be obnoxious to the rage of popular reſentment.

her own dominions: No decrees of fraternity are made by her Legiſlators: No orator of the human race is permitted to propoſe to them, that every altar and every throne be levelled with the duſt, and that every country in the world be annexed as a department to the French Republic. The preſent Government of France has itſelf been eſtabliſhed on the overthrow of a ſeditious faction, which, notwithſtanding its defeat, ſtill meditates inſurrection and aſpires to empire; and the members of that Government know that they cannot excite univerſal revolt abroad without encouraging rebellion at home. They are therefore, as averſe to high revolutionary principles as any ſtateſmen in Europe. They have entirely abandoned the old ſyſtem of confraternity. They have not eſtabliſhed or encouraged the propagation of their political principles in any of the countries they have conquered, except in thoſe which they meant to retain in their poſſeſſion and form into departments, and thoſe in which their encouragement of thoſe principles facilitated their military operations. In theſe countries they employed their political principles merely as inſtruments of hoſtility. We cannot reproach an open enemy with availing himſelf of a formidable weapon. Who would not account that Government moſt ſtupid, who would ſpurn the proffered alliance of enthuſiaſm, and create enmity to their

cauſe

cauſe and oppoſition to their projects, when they might ſecure zealous friendſhip and powerful co-operation. It would be as abſurd to cenſure the French Generals for countenancing and aſſiſting the Republicans of Flanders and Holland, as to blame our Commanders for countenancing and aſſiſting the Royaliſts in Martinique and St. Domingo. France does not now, as Mr. Burke continually repreſents, exert her power to extend her principles: but ſhe avails herſelf of her principles to aggrandize her power. She has long been extremely cautious of eſtabliſhing them, (much more cautious than could have been expected from her former revolutionary zeal) except where they favor her projects of national ambition. In Piedmont, if the beſt ſort of newſpaper information may be depended on, the French General Buonaparte aſſiſted the late King of Sardinia in quelling ſome diſturbances among his ſubjects, and in puniſhing ſome vaſſals who had riſen againſt their Lords. It is alſo ſaid that this General diſcouraged all revolutionary proceedings in Lombardy, until the Emperor, having put an end to the truce which had ſubſiſted between his armies and thoſe of the French Republic on the Rhine, had declared his intention of continuing the war, for objects which France was unwilling to yield, and had thus occaſioned her to form the deſign of annexing his Italian Dominions to her

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mighty Empire, or of modelling them into a ſeparate Republic. The French Government appear to have been very dilatory and reluctant in changing the political ſyſtem of Lombardy. Their journals avow the motives of their conduct. They are ſenſible of the energy of freedom, and they apprehend that the eſtabliſhment of a popular Republic in the heart of Italy, might render that country one of their moſt formidable enemies. They are not merely indifferent, they are hoſtile to the extenſion of Republican principles beyond their own territory.

In Belgium, and the other conquered countries which they intended to form into departments and unite to France, they naturally eſtabliſhed her political ſyſtem. They would have acted moſt abſurdly if they had ſuffered any of their provinces to have retained a form of Government entirely different from that of their empire. In Holland indeed, which they have not modelled into a department, they have effected a revolution by co-operating with the democratic party. But that party had been favorable to French politics ever ſince we had eſpouſed the cauſe of the Stadtholder, and would probably have been aſſiſted by France if ſhe had atchieved the conqueſt of Holland under the auſpices and Government of Louis the ſixteenth. The enemy could never have drawn

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from Holland the advantages which that country has actually afforded to him ſince he ſubdued it, unleſs he had countenanced ſome party or other. The democrats, it is ſaid, formed the ſtrongeſt party. They were certainly the party moſt friendly to the conqueror, who deſirous of making the moſt of his acquiſition, fraternized with them, aided them in eſtabliſhing their favorite ſyſtem, and permitted them to regulate the Government of their country as they pleaſed, on condition of co-operating with him in his ambitious projects.

But what puts out of all doubt that the French Government are no longer poſſeſſed with the ſpirit of propagating democracy, is their conduct in the laſt campaign, whilſt they were in poſſeſſion of a portion of Germany, containing the territories of many abſolute Princes. If they had been revolutionary zealots they would have then endeavoured to eſtabliſh their revolutionary principles in thoſe places; but it is notorious that they did not attempt to excite any revolution in any one of them; that they did not dethrone any Prince, untitle any Nobleman, or unbenefice any Miniſter of religion. Their prudence has entirely overcome their zeal. They do not now, like Mahomet, make their invaſions, the ſword in one hand and their creed in the other, except where their creed will procure them ſome ſolid advantages. Experience has

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taught them that the ſword by itſelf is often more formidable. Some of their enemies are too ignorant and barbarous to be wrought upon by revolutionary principles. Mahomet had this advantage in propagating his ſyſtem, that he could not find an enemy too barbarous to be his proſelyte. The moſt ignorant and barbarous were the moſt likely to be influenced by extravagant hopes and terrors of an unknown world, and to receive his ſtupid ravings as the inſpiration of heaven. But the principles of democracy implicate many complex and ſome highly refined ideas, neither ſuited to the taſte, nor within the comprehenſion of the groſsly ignorant*. In countries whoſe inhabitants are of this

* Nothing is expreſſed in this propoſition either favorable or hoſtile to democratic principles. The moſt abſurd ſyſtem may require cultivated intellects to comprehend and maintain it. Who ever embraced or defended atheiſm, that moſt abſurd of all ſyſtems, but perſons of ſome degree of acuteneſs? Mr. Jenkinſon (now Lord Hawkeſbury) made a juſt remark on this ſubject in the Houſe of Commons, for which however he was reproved. He ſaid "he laughed at the idea of democratic principles being prevalent in Ruſſia and Poland. The people of theſe countries were too barbarous to receive them." I ſhould wiſh to know how a revolutioniſt would make the vaſſal of a Ruſſian Boyard comprehend that "a Republic is one and indiviſible;" that "the Sovereignty reſides in the univerſality of the Citizens;" that "each Citizen delegates his portion of the ſovereignty to his repreſentative." I ſee no other method of gaining this vaſſal's hearty concurrence in any political ſcheme, but by convincing

this deſcription, democracy cannot prevail, unleſs eſtabliſhed and maintained by a force ſufficient to keep them in complete ſubjection. The French Government are well acquainted with this. They do not now take the trouble to revolutionize barbarians: Solely intent upon national aggrandizement, they find much fitter employment for their armies than in enforcing democratic doctrines in the mountains and foreſts of Germany. They annoy their enemy quite in the regular, old-faſhioned way; by demoliſhing his fortreſſes; by ſeizing on ſo much of his territories as they can conveniently hold; by levying contributions on his ſubjects; by forcing from him commercial immunities and privileges. They contend for wealth and dominion exactly in the ſtyle of Francis I. For the purpoſes of their ambition, they are willing to countenance and aſſiſt perſons of every ſect in politics and

convincing him that if it ſucceeds he will have warmer cloaths, better food, leſs work, and more brandy. There was one meaſure, and perhaps but one, that might have eſtabliſhed the revolution in Poland—the complete emancipation of all the vaſſals from all perſonal ſubjection to their Lords. If, in addition to this enfranchiſement, a ſmall portion of land could have been given to each vaſſal at a moderate rent, the great and ſudden melioration of the condition of the maſs of the people, thus effected by the revolution, might have given them ſo ſtrong an attachment to it, and occaſioned them to make ſuch zealous exertions in its defence, that the whole power of the Ruſſian empire would have been inſufficient to prevent its completion.

religion; whether deſirous of noble or popular rule; whether attached to monarchy or deſpotiſm; whether Deiſts or Atheiſts; whether baptized or infidel. To promote the aggrandizement of the French Republic, her rulers have given equal proofs of their attachment to the Grand Signor, the King of Pruſſia, the Lords of Piedmont, and the people of Lombardy; to the Papiſts of Milan, the Jews of Amſterdam, and the Mahometans of Conſtantinople. Theſe are facts of notoriety. They prove that Mr. Burke's ſtatement of the nature and principle of the war is fundamentally erroneous. It cannot be conſidered in any reſpect as a "civil war;" or a war againſt an "armed doctrine," or a nation of Propagandiſts. We contend with a nation of enterpriſing warriors. Our enemy is ſtrictly "local and territorial." His ſtrength conſiſts in his territories, his fortreſſes, his armies, and in his abundant material reſources, rendered formidable by his activity, and dangerous by his ambition. We have to repreſs the rulers of France as a Government endeavouring to extend their empire; not to exterminate them as a ſect of fanatical Atheiſts attempting to barbarize the world.

From Mr. Burke's repreſentation it would appear that France had been conquered, and is now governed by a tribe of atheiſtical vagabonds,

bonds, who had been roving about the world in queſt of proſelytes. But the truth is, that ſhe is governed by her own citizens excluſively, and not by any ſuch wandering tribe; and ſo jealous is ſhe of any other than national Government, that her Conſtitution excludes from the humbleſt political privileges of a French citizen, all foreigners who have not lived within her territory for a ſufficient time, to juſtify the preſumption that they are nationally attached to her. The ambition of the French rulers is of the old kind, ſtrictly national; and it muſt be guarded againſt and repreſſed in the old way. When this is effected, as far as circumſtances require and will permit, peace may be made with the French Republic with as great ſafety to our Religion, Conſtitution, Property and Laws, as peace can be made with any other powerful, ambitious and enterpriſing State. The opinion that we ſhould war with the '*exiſtence*' and not the *conduct* of the French Republic, is as void of foundation, as it would be dreadful if adopted and acted upon.

To ſhew that her rulers aim at the deſtruction of every Government in Europe, Mr. Burke obſerves, that "they have hitherto conſtantly "declined any other then a treaty with a ſingle "power," and that "they muſt be worſe than "blind who do not ſee with what undeviating

"regularity of ſyſtem, in this caſe and in all caſes, "they purſue their ſcheme for the utter de- "ſtruction of every independent power, eſpe- "cially the ſmaller, who can not find any refuge "whatever but in ſome common cauſe*."

The French Government declared, in their anſwer† to Lord Malmſbury's memorial, that they did not decline treating with Great Britain and her allies, conjointly. That they have hitherto preferred treating with their enemies ſingly, is no proof that they purſue a ſcheme for the utter deſtruction of them all. Their policy in this reſpect was ſo obvious, that they would have been extremely ſtupid if they had preferred any other. It is the policy by which a great confederacy is moſt likely to be broken and confounded; and the adoption of it by France proves no more than that ſhe was deſirous of getting rid of her enemies on the beſt terms. A confederacy of three nations is now formed againſt us. Suppoſe an ambaſſador were ſent by the King of Spain to treat for peace with Great Britain; would your Grace adviſe his Majeſty to decline treating until an ambaſſador ſhould come from the French Republic? Would you not eagerly ſeize the opportunity of detaching an ally

* Page 41.

† This anſwer did not appear until after the publication of Mr. Burke's letters.

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from the great enemy? If you had good reaſon to believe that his Majeſty could now make a ſeparate peace with the King of Spain, on as favorable terms as France obtained from ſeveral of the combined powers, would you not adviſe every meaſure, conſiſtent with our juſt national dignity, to expedite ſuch a fortunate event? Would you not defer, if not abſolutely decline treating with our enemies conjointly, if you could treat with them ſeparately, and were well aſſured that by doing ſo, you could procure for your country a more honorable and more advantageous peace? What would you think of the Republican politicians if they made this conduct of yours a ſubject of complaint and invective, and repreſented his Majeſty's wiſdom in providing for the ſafety, proſperity, and glory of his people, as a proof that he was purſuing a ſcheme for the utter deſtruction of every independent power? Would you not deem their accuſation unfounded and ridiculous; and compare the authors of them to children, who in their little battles complain that their antagoniſts ſtrike too hard? It would be as juſt, becoming, and magnanimous in the enemy to inveigh againſt us for the victories of our fleets and armies, as for the ſucceſs of our negotiations.

Mr. Burke conſiders the change which France has made in her laws, manners, morals and uſages

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as further evidence of her determined hoſtility to all mankind*.

It is impoſſible to proceed in the examination of this ſubject without remarking how groſsly and flagitiouſly France has been calumniated by the perſons from whom Mr. Burke derives his information. They who ſuppoſe that his deſcriptions of manners and morals in France† are juſt, muſt conclude that human nature itſelf has been completely changed in that country; that they are not men who inhabit it, but monſters in the human form, ſuch as have been fabled by writers of wild and extravagant imagination.

His deſcriptions of the ſtate of France are equally diſguſting and unfounded: his abuſe of her Government is groſs and ſcurrilous in the higheſt degree. The French Republic he denominates "mother of monſters; bank of circulation of all pernicious principles; an infamous brothel; a night-cellar for ſuch thieves, murderers and houſe-breakers as never infeſted the world—corrupted, bloody, fierce, hypocritical, perfidious, cannibal Republic." Her rulers and ſupporters he calls "obſcure ruffians, atheiſtical fanatics, murderers, ſyſtematic robbers; lewd and debauched

* Page 111. † From page 96, to page 107.

"banditti

" banditti, aſſaſſins, bravos and ſmugglers; canni-
" bals, beaſts of prey, furious and ſavage."—What credit is due to a writer who founds all his arguments upon ſuch ſtatements and repreſentations as theſe? May it not be preſumed, even from his manner of writing, that he uſes much exaggeration; that his portraits are highly coloured by fiction, and that his furious and unbridled zeal has entirely perverted his judgement. Does not his addreſſing himſelf conſtanly to our paſſions, rather than to our underſtanding, prove that his cauſe is weak, and that it would not bear the teſt of calm and rational inveſtigation?

Few points can be eſtabliſhed by better evidence than that France bears no reſemblance at this time, to the horrible Nation that he has deſcribed under her name. We know that the majority of her people are employed, either in the uſeful labours of agriculture, or in the more arduous and more virtuous duty of defending their country; that of the remainder, ſome are occupied in the important taſks of legiſlating, and of adminiſtering laws; others in high purſuits of ſcience; others in the elegant cultivation of the arts; others in the acquiſition of wealth; others in queſt of renown: all actuated probably, by the ſame ſort of motives, good and bad; fair, corrupt, and compounded, that urge the inhabitants

inhabitants of this Iſland in their various purſuits. Is it poſſible that they are cannibals, ſavages and obſcure ruffians, who have been more careful than any Government in the world, in providing inſtitutions for learned and uſeful education? Is it poſſible that thoſe works of genius, judgment and erudition that come to us almoſt daily from France, and excite our warmeſt admiration, are executed by debauched banditti, aſſaſſins, bravos and ſmugglers? Does the hiſtory of the whole world exhibit a ſingle inſtance of a debauched and depraved nation, poſſeſſing ſuch a proud and ardent ſpirit of nationality as now animates the French people? No: their zealous and generous devotion to their country, in all the viciſſitudes of her fortune, is utterly incompatible with depravity, debauchery and ſome other abominable vices that Mr. Burke lays to their charge. Theſe would ſuffer no paſſions but the vile and ſelfiſh to exiſt in their minds. Some of their very faults; their haughtineſs and arrogance with reſpect to foreign nations; their ſelf-ſufficiency and unreaſonable pride; their perſeverance in purſuit of whatever they undertake, juſt or unjuſt; their inſolent and unbounded ambition, will reſcue them from Mr. Burke's imputation of groſs and ſavage wickedneſs, and demonſtrate that they are not ſunk in brutiſh depravity.

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Your Grace will not imagine from what I now ſay, that I am diſpoſed to be the advocate of the French Government or the panegyriſt of the French nation. I wiſh to repreſent it, as an enterpriſing and formidable enemy whom we ſhould oppoſe, if we muſt ſtill oppoſe, no otherwiſe than by fair hoſtility; and whoſe friendſhip we may accept of with honor whenever we can cultivate it with ſafety: not as an aſſemblage of vile and fanatical barbarians, who are hoſtile to the whole human race, and whom we muſt therefore purſue to utter deſtruction. I wiſh to refute the calumnies that might make his Majeſty's people diſcontented with that meaſure (the formal recognition of the French Republic) which his Majeſty was adviſed to adopt with a view to terminate the calamities of war. I wiſh to ſhew that a treaty of peace and alliance (which may Heaven accelerate,) may be made by us with the French Republic, without being diſgraceful to England, or even in the ſmalleſt degree injurious to her high reputation.

Sooner or later peace muſt be made between France and England; but peace between ſuch proud, martial and high-ſpirited nations can never be of long duration, whilſt either of them is exaſperated againſt the other; and it is impoſſible for this country not to be exaſperated againſt France, if perſuaded that Mr. Burke ſpeaks the truth. I take it for granted, that a permanent

peace with France, would be much more beneficial to Great Britain than frequent wars with her. It is therefore, the duty of every Britiſh ſubject to prevent, as far as he is able, the irritation and exaſperation which Mr. Burke's unjuſt invectives againſt France might produce in the public mind.

Continuing his ſtrain of rancorous abuſe, he aſſerts that the French Legiſlators* "have omitted "no pains to eradicate every benevolent and "noble propenſity in the mind of man," and that "their law of divorce, like all their laws, had "not for it's object the relief of domeſtic un-"eaſineſs, but the total corruption of all morals, "the total diſconnection of ſocial life†."

On the very face of this ſtatement it muſt (I hope) be a miſrepreſentation. I cannot believe there ever exiſted a body of men who undertook, with cool and ſteady deſign, to effect the total corruption of all morals. The rulers of France could have had no intereſted motive for attempting ſuch atrocious and ſtupid wickedneſs. Hiſtory does not exhibit any race of men, nor has any writer of correct imagination ever fabled a claſs of beings, coolly and ſteadily wicked without

* Page 101. † Page 104.

ſelfiſh

ſelfiſh inducements, or perpetrating miſchief only for the delight of contemplating miſery. Our great poet will not ſuffer even thoſe Spirits, whom he repreſents as the ſource and perfection of every thing guilty and abominable, to purſue their projects without the impulſe of a powerful motive. If the French Legiſlators meditated, as Mr. Burke aſſerts, the ſubjugation of the world of Europe to their laws, manners and opinions, they muſt have loſt their ſenſes if they would knowingly produce or encourage corruption of morals. The execution of that daring deſign would require the aid of every ſtern and rigid virtue; of courage unappalled by any dangers; of patience in difficulties and hardſhips; of devoted zeal; of perſeverance againſt reverſes of fortune; of prompt and blind obedience. It would have demanded the ſacrifice of every private feeling, every ſelfiſh regard, to the public ambition. Would the practice of theſe virtues be promoted by an univerſal diſſoluteneſs, and the total corruption of all morals?

Diſſoluteneſs and corruption of morals, when ſpread over a whole nation, will inevitably give it a torpid, voluptuous, feeble and effeminate character. If France has formed a ſcheme of hoſtility againſt the human race, a law that would produce diſſolute and licentious manners in a

conſiderable degree among all her citizens, would be more beneficial to mankind, and more ruinous to her guilty ambition, than the annihilation of half of her armies and the capture of all her frontier fortreſſes. No diſſolute and debauched people have ever yet ſubverted the liberties of any conſiderable portion of the world. If the hiſtory of every age and nation can be depended on; if Lycurgus and the fathers of antient Rome are of any authority; if Bacon, More, Harrington, Monteſquieu, Hume, and the whole race of ſpeculative juriſts and political philoſophers are not completely miſtaken, the Legiſlators of an aſpiring, martial Republic ſhould not only diſcourage, but ſhould moſt rigouroufly repreſs licentious and diſſolute manners. Theſe manners deſtroy all the virtues, and even the vices that enable ſuch a State to accompliſh her ends. They render a people unable to endure the fatigues and hardſhips of military duty; loth to encounter dangers; unwilling to ſacrifice, or even forego their eaſe and pleaſures on any account, and careleſs, except as they are perſonally intereſted, of their country's glory or diſgrace, her aggrandizement or her ruin. Diſſolute manners are but little favorable to thoſe ſhocking, unnatural exertions of patriotiſm, which have ſometimes filled a whole people with a frantic ſpirit that has rendered them invincible and irreſiſtible. Diſſoluteneſs with all

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its evil is not univerſally corrupting. Although it always diminiſhes patriotiſm, it does not always extinguiſh the natural affections.

I do not mean to deny that the oppoſite vices of unnatural ſeverity, and extreme diſſoluteneſs may exiſt in the ſame nation, and that the ſame city may contain a Brutus and a Meſſalina. But I maintain that the Legiſlators who wiſh to avail themſelves of the rigid patriotiſm of the one, are mad if they encourage the depravity of the other: for that depravity, if become general, would not only prevent any prodigies of patriotiſm, but would deſtroy all rational attachment to the public cauſe.

Since the downfall of Jacobiniſm, we do not hear of any of thoſe ſhocking exertions of public or party ſpirit, that were at one time ſo much applauded in France. By ſome perſons, theſe patriotic enormities are called virtues, and they are generally characteriſed by an epithet taken, with great propriety indeed, from the name of that nation that robbed and enſlaved as much as ſhe could find of the world. I confeſs I feel abhorrence, not admiration, at thoſe conqueſts of nationality over nature. I deteſt all laws, inſtitutions, and opinions that require the man to be ſacrificed to the State, and private virtues to public ambition. When

ſuch

ſuch ſacrifices are demanded and applauded, the foundations of moral philoſophy are rudely and dangerouſly ſhaken. The moral rules muſt vary according to political circumſtances. Public opinion, the ſtrongeſt ſanction of moral law, will be depraved, and will afford all its authority to recommend as examples, thoſe exceſſes and crimes which are committed, or may be pretended to be committed, with the moſt heroical intentions in the ardor of an ungovernable patriotiſm.

Country is a moral being that we have created ourſelves, and that we ſupport for our own advantage. It can neither deſtroy nor ſupercede the rights of thoſe beings, to whom the Sovereign Legiſlator of the Univerſe, providing for our advantage by means, certainly much wiſer and fitter than any that we can deviſe for that purpoſe, has drawn us by a ſtronger attachment, and bound us by a prior obligation. The factitious rights and duties cannot take place of the natural. Our country cannot require of us to forget our natural affections; to violate any duty or perpetrate any crime. If in ſome circumſtances, ſhe has the right to require the violation of any one duty or the perpetration of any one crime, ſhe may in other circumſtances have the right to require the violation of any other duty or the perpetration of any other crime; and therefore ſhe may command us

to

to violate all our natural duties and to perpetrate all ſorts of crimes. If ſhe can juſtly require you to murder your ſon, ſhe may, by a leſs rigorous exaction, command you to betray your friend, to rob your benefactor, to violate your oath; and indeed all thoſe crimes, when ſuppoſed to have been perpetrated from revolutionary motives, were applauded in France during the flagitious reign of the Jacobin faction. But this moral being, Country, exiſts only for the general good, which is it's law, and which ſets limits to its claims. It cannot therefore require what would be ſo utterly ſubverſive of the general good, as the violation of natural duties and the perpetration of crimes.

A blind, unlimited, and excluſive devotion to cauſe and country, has occaſioned ſome of the greateſt calamities that have ever ſcourged the human race. It was a vicious enthuſiaſm that enabled the Roman robbers to pillage the Earth, and a few wretched and ignorant fanatics of the deſert, to barbarize almoſt all the nations of Aſia, and one of the fineſt and moſt celebrated portions of Europe. A furious zeal has often made the mildeſt of all theological ſyſtems, the Chriſtian religion, appear the moſt deteſtable; and has transformed that diſpenſation of mercy into a cruel ſcourge. Liberty, the greateſt of all temporal bleſſings, when cheriſhed and ſupported by a rational

rational attachment, has been made by the raſh enthuſiaſm of its advocates, to produce as much miſery as the moſt ſavage deſpotiſm. It was this frantic principle that gave ſucceſs for a time to the Jacobins, and had almoſt enabled them to plant their affiliated and aſſociated gangs, more abominable than that murderous Junto that Sparta impoſed upon the vanquiſhed Athenians, in the midſt of the fineſt countries on the continent of Europe. Happily for the quiet and ſafety of the world, this ſavage and ferocious enthuſiaſm has expired in France along with the ſyſtem that gave it birth. Her people are ſtill animated in her cauſe by a warm and generous zeal: a paſſion as remote from the furious and dangerous Jacobin enthuſiaſm, as inconſiſtent with a corrupt and depraved national character.

During the whole diſcuſſion on the law of divorce, the object of which, according to Mr. Burke, was the total corruption of all morals, I happened to be in Paris, and to be acquainted with ſome of the members of the National Aſſembly who were active in ſupport of that meaſure. I am firmly perſuaded that they had no ſuch objects in view as the corruption of morals and the total diſconnection of ſocial life. They acted in this inſtance as in many others, without ſufficient caution and conſideration. The law of divorce

was

was adopted in the delirium of liberty*. An indiſſoluble engagement of any kind, appeared to the democratic enthuſiaſts, deſtructive of freedom. They expatiated on the diſſoluteneſs and domeſtic miſery that prevailed throughout France, occaſioned, as they aſſerted, by the abuſe of the ancient paternal power, and by the licentious manners that had grown up under the ancient ſyſtem. The object of the law of divorce was not to corrupt morals, but to relieve the domeſtic diſquietudes that corrupt morals had produced: but although

* Mr. Burke, (through inadvertency I preſume) has ſtated the law of divorce inaccurately. He ſays in page 102, "Proceeding in the ſpirit of the firſt authors of their Conſtitution, "ſucceeding aſſemblies went the full length of the principle, "and gave a licenſe to divorce at the mere pleaſure of either "party, and *at a month's notice.*"—The law of divorce, paſſed by the National Aſſembly in September 1792, provided, that when either party demanded to be divorced without the conſent of the other, and aſſigned no other cauſe for the demand, than incompatibility of tempers and diſpoſitions, the perſon making the demand ſhould ſignify it to a municipal officer, who was directed to cauſe the relations of both parties to have a meeting at the expiration of three months. If they could not then reconcile the couple, they were to hold a ſecond meeting, for the ſame friendly purpoſe, at the expiration of three months from the time of the firſt meeting; and if this ſecond attempt at reconciliation failed, the divorce, if inſiſted upon was allowed without further delay. A divorce at the pleaſure of either party was therefore not permitted without at leaſt *ſix month's* notice.—See La Loi de Divorce.

its purpoſe was good, its operation was certainly pernicious. It did not ſufficiently reſtrain capricious ſeparations, nor ſufficiently protect thoſe who ſtand moſt in need of protection. It abandoned the moſt feeble and moſt amiable of our ſpecies to the mercy of thoſe who, if they ever have the deteſtable inclination, will always have the power to injure them. The zeal of the authors of this law prevented them from foreſeeing its conſequences, or from conſidering them with ſufficient attention. In the eſtimation of thoſe enthuſiaſts, nothing was of account when ſet in oppoſition to boundleſs liberty. But Mr. Burke will attribute nothing of the conduct of the revolutioniſts, no not a ſingle act or endeavour, to miſtaken zeal; nothing to wild, extravagant enthuſiaſm; nothing even to ignorance, ſtupidity or folly, or to any other cauſe that might in any degree extenuate their errors. He finds the ſource of every one of their meaſures in wicked cunning; in cold, deſigning villainy; in determined hoſtility to the human race; in perſecuting atheiſm; in ſyſtems of pure, unchequered guilt; in the radical depravity, and the inherent, inveterate, incurable corruption of their nature.

Speaking of the new laws, uſages and manners of France, he makes theſe obſervations, "The "whole body of this new ſyſtem of manners in

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" ſupport of the new ſcheme of politics, I conſider
" as a ſtrong and deciſive proof of determined
" ambition and ſyſtematic hoſtility. I defy the
" moſt refining ingenuity to invent any other
" cauſe for the total departure of the Jacobin
" Republic from every one of the ideas and uſages,
" religious, legal, moral, or ſocial, of this civi-
" lized world, and for tearing herſelf from it's
" communion with ſuch ſtudied violence, but
" from a formed reſolution of keeping no terms
" with that world*."

No refining ingenuity is requiſite to ſhew that the new ſyſtem of Government of France demanded a correſponding ſyſtem of laws, uſages and manners, and that ſhe could not effectually eſtabliſh the one without the aid of the other. Having aboliſhed the feudal ſyſtem, as well as all the privileges, immunities, and diſtinctions of the Orders, and laſtly, the Monarchical Government, ſhe acted only with common ſenſe in aboliſhing all the feudal or gothic laws and uſages; all the adopted titles of the Roman law that related to monarchical Government, and all the laws, cuſtoms, manners, and uſages that had any connexion with the feudal ſyſtem, with the privileges, immunities, and diſtinctions of the Orders, or with the power, influence, and ſplendor of the throne. A revolution in the ſyſtem of Government can never be completed

* Page 111

unleſs laws, uſages, and manners above all, are made congenial with the new order of things. If the old laws and manners remain, they will perpetually recall the old ſyſtem of Government to remembrance; they will make its loſs regretted, and in the courſe of time, or at any favorable opportunity, they may occaſion its reſtoration. I doubt whether the laws of landed property that are deduced from the feudal inſtitutions, and the cuſtoms and manners that prevailed in France, during her ancient regimen, could exiſt in a democratic republic. If they could exiſt in it for any time, they would be at perpetual variance with the ſpirit of the Government. It would ſit heavily and aukwardly upon them. It would keep them in continual fear, and ſubject them to unceaſing vexation. They would always ſigh for the return of that Government, that inſtead of threatening, inſulting, and deſpiſing, would foſter and protect them. How came it that at the reſtoration of our Charles IInd. the Republican Government expired in England without a ſtruggle or a groan? Becauſe the old laws, uſages, cuſtoms, and manners had been left almoſt untouched. Every thing was congenial with the old Conſtitution. The country was conquered by the fanatics as by a band of Mamelukes, but not revolutionized. She thought, felt, and acted monarchically. Republicaniſm was violence during this time. The reſtoration of the old Conſti-

Conſtitution was the reſtoration of the natural order of things, and it was accompliſhed with a facility that appears incredible to thoſe who do not ſufficiently conſider the powerful influence of uſages and manners. The people naturally exulted at the reſtoration of the ſyſtem from which their prejudices and affections had never been drawn away by any revolutionary artifices. Much as its re-eſtabliſhment was facilitated and accelerated by its own merits, it was greatly indebted to the ignorance and ſtupidity of its fanatical enemies. They had no management. They knew nothing but vile cant. Although complete maſters of the country for eleven years, thoſe barbarous uſurpers could make no impreſſion upon it, except what was ruinous to themſelves, their Government, and their religion.

Far different has been the conduct of the Revolutioniſts of France. They have ſuffered nothing to remain that could militate againſt the genius of their inſtitutions. La Vendée was the only part of France impervious to their revolutionary operations, and it's long and zealous attachment to the ancient ſyſtem may be attributed, in a conſiderable degree, to the little change that was effected in it by the revolutionary meaſures. All theſe circumſtances ſhould be well weighed by thoſe whom the reſtoration of Charles IInd. ſtill

encourages

encourages to expect the re-eſtabliſhment of the throne of Bourbon. We can account very ſatisfactorily for the change which the French Republic has made in her laws, cuſtoms, uſages and manners, without ſuppoſing with Mr. Burke, that ſhe had formed a "reſolution of keeping no terms with the world," or that ſhe had any other motive in this inſtance, than a ſtrong deſire of firmly eſtabliſhing, maintaining, and perpetuating her own ſyſtem of Government within her own dominions.

The change in her laws has not been quite ſo great as Mr. Burke repreſents. Moſt of the articles of the Roman law, relating to promiſes, contracts, and other objects, and not interfering with the Republican ſyſtem, that were formerly adopted by France, are ſtill found in her code, and are meant to be preſerved, if Cambaceres has ſpoken the ſenſe of her Legiſlature.

But if the change in her laws, manners and uſages had been as great as poſſible, it would not only not be a good ground of eternal war with her, but it might not prevent an eternal peace between her and every nation in Europe. We have long been at peace with nations who differ from us in almoſt every thing in which human beings can differ; in form of Government, religion, laws, cuſ-

toms,

toms, ceremonies, manners, prejudices and opinions; with the Ottoman Empire; with the States of Barbary; with Poland and Ruſſia. The good underſtanding that we have maintained with thoſe States cannot be wholly attributed to their diſtance from us, ſince our navy would ſpeedily bring them all within reach of our power. Our wars have been almoſt always with the countries whoſe governments, laws, manners, and uſages moſt nearly reſembled our own. "Reſemblances, conformities, and ſympathies*," do indeed lead us to aſſociate; but they very often occaſion us to quarrel. They make us purſue the ſame objects: they therefore create rivalſhip and contention. "Nothing," ſays Mr. Burke, "is ſo ſtrong a tie "of amity between nation and nation, as correſ-"pondence in laws, cuſtoms, manners, and habits "of life." Yet ſuch a correſpondence between the States of Greece formerly, and between many of the nations of Europe in modern times, by giving them the ſame views, the ſame wants, the ſame ſort of ambition, and by urging them to the attainment of their objects in the ſame manner, cauſed perpetual rivalſhips, jealouſies, animoſities and contentions between them. Nations that are candidates for the ſame ſort of power, wealth and renown, muſt frequently claſh in their purſuits,

* Page 108.

and

and the diſcordance will produce irritation enough to occaſion a rupture. France and England have long ſought to acquire wealth, dominion, and influence in the world, by the ſame means, and they have found in almoſt every object of their ambition a ſource of diſagreement.

Thoſe reſemblances between nations have often made their wars more rancorous as well as more frequent. The moſt trivial diſagreements have occaſioned the moſt ſpiteful and ſanguinary conflicts. Mr. Burke obſerves with ſatisfaction that "the nations of Europe have had the very ſame Chriſtian "religion, agreeing in the fundamental parts, varying "a little in the ceremonies and in the ſubordinate "doctrines." Yet theſe ceremonies and ſubordinate doctrines; the faſhion of a hood; the placing of a table; the dreſs of a prieſt; the decorations of a church; the mode of commemorating the circumſtance on which our religion is founded; the form of a prayer; the moſt trivial and unintelligible tenets have produced amongſt Chriſtians as rancourous and bloody wars as they have ever maintained againſt the Pagan or the Mahometan; and have occaſioned the moſt cruel and atrocious baniſhments, impriſonments, perſecutions, burnings, aſſaſſinations and maſſacres that diſgrace the annals of the world.

If,

If, at the commencement of the reign of Louis XIV. France had become diſſimilar to this country in every reſpect, by being ſuddenly converted to the Mahometan religion, and to Mahometan politics, opinions, manners, uſages and habits of life, ſuch as they are at this time, we might not have had one conteſt with her ever ſince. She would not have given herſelf the leaſt concern whether we were Papiſts, Lutherans or Calviniſts; whether our King was a Tudor or a Stuart, or of the illuſtrious Line of Brunſwick; whether the High Church or the Low Church, the Whig or the Tory preponderated in our Legiſlature. She would have viewed with great indifference and compoſure our riſing colonies in America; our conqueſts in the Eaſt and Weſt Indies; our commercial monopolies; and we ſhould have contemplated her affairs without any emotion except what might ariſe from our curioſity; little anxious about the intrigues of the Divan or the Seraglio; little concerned whether the ſect of Ali or the ſect of Omar was triumphant. It is difficult to ſuppoſe any cauſe of rupture with France, in this ſituation, not originating with ourſelves. Thus a total diſſimilitude in laws, cuſtoms, manners and habits of life, inſtead of being the cauſe of perpetual enmity, may be a ſtrong preſervative of perpetual peace between nations.

I have hitherto maintained little more than that peace *may* be made, ſafely and honorably, with the French Republic. On the advantages of peace it is unneceſſary to expatiate. The topic, although ſo fertile, has been nearly exhauſted. There is however, one among thoſe advantages that has not been conſidered with the attention it merits: I mean the happy influence that peace would have upon the French Republic; in ſoothing her ſufferings; in mollifying her ſtern character; in lowering her high military ſpirit; in deſtroying what may yet remain of the revolutionary enthuſiaſm; in a word in directing all her valour, enterpriſe, perſeverance, activity and energy to other purpoſes than conqueſt or deſtruction. She might ſoon be diſtinguiſhed for refinement and bleſſed with proſperity. I ſhall be told, perhaps, that ſhe would then become a formidable commercial rival to Great Britain. Be it ſo. She will be a much leſs dangerous rival to us as a commercial than as a warlike Republic. It is in vain to deny it: Great commerical proſperity tends not only to mollify and refine, but to enfeeble a national character. A nation of rich merchants and manufacturers is a far leſs formidable foe, than a nation of fierce and hungry warriors.

If I were perfectly neutral in this great conteſt, I ſhould wiſh very ſincerely for the peaceful happi-

happineſs of ſo large a portion of my fellow beings as the people of France. But as one of their enemies, I wiſh for it moſt ardently. What would be our ſituation if we had reduced France to extreme poverty and wretchedneſs, and had deprived her of all hope of improving her condition, except by conqueſt or plunder? The exuberance of her population, impelled by political paſſions only, carried terror and diſmay into moſt of the Nations of Europe. What then would ſhe not atchieive if, impelled by the neceſſity of preſerving life and by vengeance, as well as by enthuſiaſm, her whole race were to guſh forth on all ſides, uniting Vandal fury with Spartan valor and Roman perſeverance and the military ſcience in higher perfection than it was ever poſſeſſed by any other people? I confeſs I ſincereiy hope that France may ſoon become rich enough to have more to fear than to hope from the depredations of war, and that ſhe may derive ſo much proſperity and happineſs from the re-eſtabliſhment of peace, as to make her ardently deſirous of its eternal preſervation.

It is evident that a general peace would have the happieſt influence upon France. The partial treaties of peace which ſhe has already made, have had it in ſo great a degree as to have diveſted her of the ſavage ferocity that marked her character whilſt ſhe was aſſailed by all the confederate

powers. I conſider the effect that a peace of tolerable duration would have upon the martial ſpirit and the political ardor of the French people, of ſuch importance, that I believe the French Republic, bounded by the Rhine, the Mountains, the Mediterranean and the Ocean, would be a leſs formidable enemy after ten years of peace, than ſhe would be at this time if her empire did not extend beyond the territories ſhe poſſeſſed at the commencement of the war. It is not long ſince Spain has become her ally and our enemy. The event did not depreciate our funds an hundredth part of their value. Spain is a quiet, ſober, regular antagoniſt. Her friend has not been able to communicate to her a ſpark of his fire. One Spain coming againſt us freſh out of a revolution, would be worſe than a dozen of ſuch enemies as Spain is now*.

It has been urged that the conduct of the French Republic to ſome of her enemies and

* Mr. Burke, having diſcuſſed the ſubject of the equivalent to be offered to France for the ceſſion of the territories conquered by her from our allies, makes the following myſterious obſervation, "If you or others ſee a way out of theſe difficulties, I am "happy. I ſee indeed a fund from whence equivalents will be "propoſed. I ſee it, but I cannot juſt now touch it. It is a "queſtion of high moment. It opens another Iliad of woes to "Europe." See page 156. Concerning the nature of this fund I have formed various, but unſatisfactory conjectures.

to all the powers ſhe has made peace with, ſhould deter us from making any peace with her at all. Mr. Burke accuſes her of negociating with the inſolence of ancient Rome, and he ſeems to regard each of her Generals as a Brennus*. "Spain," ſays Mr. Burke, "is a Province of the "Jacobin Empire, and ſhe muſt make peace or "war according to the orders ſhe receives from "the Directory of Aſſaſſins." That the French Directory have great influence over her councils cannot be doubted. But it ſeems to have been acquired in ſome degree by diplomatic addreſs. It is certain at leaſt, that if her ſituation is as Mr. Burke repreſents it, ſhe is ignorant of her abaſement. She would not otherwiſe dare to ſpeak of her maſters in the contemptuous and inſulting language ſhe applied to them in her anſwer to the remonſtrance of the Court of Peterſburgh concerning her conduct to the allied powers. When ſhe publiſhed that anſwer ſhe muſt have forgotten that "the Regicide Ambaſſador" (the French Ambaſſador) "governed at Madrid." And he too muſt be unacquainted with the extent of his power, or he would not ſuffer ſuch an outrage on his dignity to remain unpuniſhed.

* "With their ſpear they draw a circle about us."—Page 61. "He is the Gaul that puts his *ſword* into the ſcale."—Page 13.

Pruſſia

Pruſſia has alſo been ſuppoſed to furniſh proofs of French inſolence. This has been preſumed in conſequence of the permiſſion granted by his Pruſſian Majeſty to the French Citizens who reſide in his territories, to diſtinguiſh themſelves by the revolutionary decoration. But from the conduct and views of the Directory and the King of Pruſſia when this diſtinction was allowed, it is extremely improbable that he granted it without ſome ſort of compenſation. The ſtrength of his dominions, and their poſition with reſpect to the French Republic, forbid the ſuppoſition that ſhe ever compelled him to make regulations of internal police.

There is not one of the other States with which ſhe has made peace that bears ſuch a relation to her, as would exiſt between the Britiſh empire and her, after the termination of the war. The power of waging war is the beſt guarantee for preſerving peace; and when a country refuſes to treat with her enemy until he has deprived her of that power ſhe lies wholly at his mercy, and can expect nothing but permiſſion to capitulate. The French Republic, like every other conquering State, has often conſulted her magnanimtiy leſs than her intereſt and her pride. But I entertain too high a confidence in our own power to apprehend that ſhe will ever preſume to treat Great Britain like one of the petty States of Italy.

With

With reſpect to our material reſources for ſupporting war, by which I mean men and military apparatus of every kind, I can ſee no end to them, provided the people will contribute to the utmoſt extent of their ability. But if they refuſe to contribute, except in the uſual, regular, and moderate manner; if they are animated by no fervent zeal; no glowing patriotiſm, to ſupport them under privations and in diſtreſs; if, in ſhort, they will not give every thing beyond what is neceſſary to ſupport themſelves to ſupport their country, I am apprehenſive that this war cannot be long continued without very great embarraſſment.

On the ſubject of the military reſources of nations, I think very erroneous opinions have been prevalent. It is not in money of any deſcription, paper or metallic, that the actual reſources of a country conſiſt, nor is it by the credit of aſſignats or mandats, or the price of any public fund that we can eſtimate the real ability of France or England. If a country produce men, ſhips, proviſions, arms and ammunition in ſufficient abundance, or what will be nearly as well, ſufficient of other valuable commodities to purchaſe what ſhe does not produce; and if her people are willing, or can be made, to contribute them for her ſervice, ſhe may wage war, defenſive or offenſive, as long as they laſt, without poſſeſſing a

ſingle

ſingle piece of coin, or any notes repreſenting coin, and without being obliged to ſupport any paper-currency by plunder. Thoſe repreſentatives of value, which have been miſtakenly conſidered as real reſources, are no more than uſeful inſtruments for obtaining the actual inſtruments of war. They greatly facilitate, but they are not abſolutely neceſſary to the transfer of them from the ſubject to the Government. In ſome ſituations the Government may lay their hands on whatever they want for the public ſervice in the firſt inſtance. But in ſuch countries as France and England, an able miniſter can never be driven to adopt this oppreſſive mode of ſupply. He muſt be extremely ignorant of the ſcience of finance, who could not maintain a good paper currency, having the whole ſurplus produce of a wealthy nation to ſupport it. If every piece of coin, and every note, bill and debenture in Great Britain were ſuddenly annihilated, the loſs would not render us unable to carry on a long and vigorous war, if the population and produce of the country continued as at preſent, and if her people were animated in ſupport of the conteſt. In theſe circumſtances I am perſuaded we could ſucceſsfully reſiſt all Europe for as long a time as Mr. Burke thinks it probable that the preſent war may continue. The loſs of the preſent circulating medium, although it would occaſion

extreme

extreme embarraſſment until a paper currency were well eſtabliſhed, would not deprive us of men or arms, or of any of the materials for attack or defence, except what the annihilated coin could have purchaſed from Foreign Countries. Nothing, indeed, ſhort of a palpable State neceſſity would juſtify the creation of a paper currency in a great commercial nation. It is an expedient productive of much evil, and I truſt we ſhall never be compelled to adopt it. If, however, a paper currency were our only reſource, it might be maintained at par by impoſing annual taxes, to be paid with the paper money only, to the amount of the paper money annually iſſued. It might even preſerve its full nominal value, if that amount exceeded thoſe taxes in a certain degree. So much of the paper money as would be abſorbed by commerce, might be ſafely iſſued, over and above the quantity of that money that would be returned to Government by the taxes. If this currency ſhould fail, another could be raiſed upon different principles. Taxes might be impoſed on actual produce, and the payment exacted in kind. What they yielded might be lodged in the Public Storehouſes, and ſuch articles as the Government had no occaſion for, might be ſold for the paper money to keep up its value; and with this paper money the Government might purchaſe what they could

not obtain by direct taxation or requiſition*. This laſt ſort of paper currency, or rather this mode of ſupporting one, is aukward and embarraſſing. It can only be neceſſary, when the firſt ſort of paper money has failed, through extravagance, bad faith, or financial inability.

France has fully ſhewn ſince the revolution, what real military reſources conſiſt of; and ſhe has completely refuted the opinion that the want of money, or even the ruin of a ſyſtem of finance, muſt neceſſarily diſable a country from proſecuting a war with vigor.

At the beginning of the revolution, the coin of France diſappeared. Its place was ſupplied by the Aſſignats, ſupported chiefly by the immenſe wealth of the Church. Rich, however, as the

* A great part of the internal commerce of the State of Virginia is carried on through the medium of a paper currency, called tobacco money. The owners of tobacco of a certain quality, are permitted to lodge it in the warehouſes of the State. Receipts, ſpecifying the quantity depoſited, are given to them, and are circulated as the ſigns of ſo much value, which, as the quality of the article repreſented is always aſcertained, can be appreciated with tolerable exactneſs. The Government of Virginia, if they poſſeſſed no ſpecie, might impoſe a tax upon tobacco to be paid in kind, and iſſue tobacco notes for the ſervice of the State, payable at the public warehouſe in ſo much tobacco as the notes repreſented.

eſtate

eſtate was that was mortgaged for them, various cauſes reduced their value ſo much, that they were at laſt hardly worth the expence of fabrication. Yet in their loweſt State, France ſupplied her armies with the moſt laviſh profuſion. She produced every thing they wanted, and her Government were maſters of every thing that ſhe produced. For a ſhort time they levied taxes on property in kind, and when preſſed hard, they made direct requiſitions. Another paper currency (the Mandats) has been eſtabliſhed, and has ſucceeded in part. Where it fails, metallic money is obtained to ſupply the deficiency. During the greateſt of the fiſcal diſtreſſes of France, ſhe carried on the war againſt the allies with an energy that cannot be derived from the moſt flouriſhing finances, unaided by the power of enthuſiaſm.

Extenſive, I had almoſt ſaid infinite, as our material reſources now are, I do not think that we ſhould be able to accompliſh the objects for which Mr. Burke adviſes the continuance of the war, if every one of us were convinced of the juſtneſs of his opinions, and fired with the ardor of his zeal. The Republican ſyſtem of France was at one time aſſailed by 500,000 men, on the very loweſt computation; conſiſting of the armies of La Vendée; thoſe of the King of Spain, the late King of Sardinia, the Italian States, the King of

Pruſſia, the Emperor, the Germanic Princes, Holland and England. Moſt of thoſe armies were highly enraged againſt the enemy; and they were all compoſed of brave, active and diſciplined troops, and were commanded by many of the ableſt generals in Europe. Yet this mighty force not only failed in its object, but failed without ever having been near the attainment of it. It failed without ever having been in a ſituation that permits us now to preſume, that it would have been completely ſucceſsful, if it had been encreaſed by two or three hundred thouſand men. Theſe numerous, well-conducted, well-appointed, obedient, brave, active, enthuſiaſtic, mighty armies, not only failed of the conqueſt of the French Republic, but they were themſelves vanquiſhed by the French Republic in a ſhorter ſpace of time, and with ſeverer, more terrible, more murderous defeat than any other force of equal magnitude, whoſe diſcomfiture is recorded in the annals of the modern world. No perſon in his ſenſes would think of attempting the conqueſt of the French Republic, or what is the ſame, the ſubverſion of her political ſyſtem, in this moment of her proſperity and triumph, with leſs than double the force, which was ſo extremely inadequate to that atchievement in the days of her greateſt difficulties and deepeſt affliction. Were a million of troops at our diſpoſal, (a force which in our preſent circumſtances it is

hardly

hardly neceſſary to ſay we cannot bring to act offenſively againſt her) I am not ſo ſanguine as to believe, that we could change the ſyſtem of her Government. Among the enemies with whom we ſhould have to contend, I look upon Louis XVIII. and his counſellors to be very formidable. Indeed the councils of the exiled Princes, appear as if guided by Sieyes. All their addreſſes, proclamations, and publications of every ſort concerning their principles and views, ſeem dictated by the genius of the French Republic. They breathe nothing but vengeance againſt all who have in the ſmalleſt degree forwarded any part, or any meaſure of the revolution; and againſt all who ſhall not aſſiſt in reſtoring, rigidly and completely, every part of the old ſyſtem of Government; every part of a ſyſtem of which ſome parts are univerſally deteſted by the whole French nation*. Experience has given no wiſdom,

* In a work publiſhed by order of the French Princes, entitled, "*Dèveloppement des principes fondamentaux de la Monarchie Françoiſe,*" the Royal Prerogative is defined to be "La Reunion du pouvoir lègiſlatif, judiciare & exécutif, le roi etant le Seul Souverain Seigneur, le Legiſlateur unique, en lui reſidant excluſivement la plenitude de l'autorité ſupreme." It is even aſſerted that "Le Roi lui-même ne peut changer en rien l'antique Conſtitution."

In another work of the ſame kind the following claſſification is made of thoſe whom it will be neceſſary to puniſh, when the Counter-

wiſdom, adverſity has taught no moderation to thoſe unhappy exiles. We could not have had leſs deſirable allies to ſupport. If the French people were the moſt torpid or ſober, in place of being the moſt animated of all Republicans, the proclamations of the Princes would rouſe them into rage, and make them reſiſt with all their might the reſtoration of the ancient monarchy. Such a King as Louis XVIII. would cauſe an inſurrection on our Royal Exchange.

Fortunately for this Country, and perhaps for the whole world, his Majeſty has not been adviſed to continue the war for the purpoſe of effecting a Counter-revolution in France. Indeed as far as France only is concerned, there ſeems no attainable object of value, for which the continuance of the war againſt her would be adviſable.

Counter-revolution takes place.—1. Ceux qui par une affreuſe combinaiſon demanderent les Etats Generaux.—2. Les hommes *oiſivement obſcurs*.—3. *Les amis des Nouveautés*.—4. Les mécontens.—5. Les ingrats.—6. Les philoſophes ou Athées.—7. Les Proteſtants.—8. Les Speculateurs abſtraits.—9. Les partiſans des deux Chambres.—10. Le parti d'Orleans.—11. Celui de M. Necker.—12. Les Republicains.—13. Tous ceux ſans exceptions qui preterent le ſerment du Jeu de Paulme.—14. Les Monarchiens.—15. Les Monarchiſtes.—16. Les Feuillans.---17. Les Miniſtériels.---18. Les Adminiſtrateurs.---19. Les Membres des Societés & des Clubs.---20. Les debris de la premiere Legiſlature.---21. Les Succeſſeurs qu'elle ſe choiſit."

Her

Her commerce as an object of booty is contemptible. Almoſt all her poſſeſſions in both the Indies are ours, except the Iſland of St. Domingo, which I am told the whole force of England would be inſufficient to ſubdue. As for France herſelf, ſhe lies before us, a mighty and impenetrable maſs of ſtrength. At home, I truſt that we are equally invulnerable; and that although we have not like France, a chain of fortreſſes to impede an invader, we are as firmly protected, ſhould even our navy fail, by the rampart that made Sparta ſo long invincible, a wall of men. Externally our ſituation is not quite ſo ſtrong. Our extenſive commerce, and our rich and numerous colonies, render us vulnerable in every quarter of the world. The peril in which theſe may be placed deſerves ſerious conſideration. But there are other objects of ſuperior importance. Great Britain has much more at ſtake than her colonies and her commerce. Ardently as I wiſh for a ſpeedy peace, and ſanguine as is my hope that it will be the foundation of uninterrupted friendſhip between France and England, and the forerunner of unexampled proſperity to the people of both nations, it would be the laſt advice I would offer to my country, to ſacrifice her freedom for the preſervation of her wealth, or to purchaſe tranquillity with diſhonor.

The

The manner in which the Directory have broken off the negotiations muſt be highly afflicting to every one who wiſhes for the termination of the war. The advocate for peace is extremely embarraſſed by their conduct. It has rendered our ſituation highly difficult. Difficult, however, and embarraſſing as it is, I truſt that the magnitude of the evil will ſuggeſt ſome remedy, and that both parties will ſacrifice ſomething of punctilio to put an end to the effuſion of human blood, and to all the other dreadful calamities of this murderous conflict.

But if no remedy can be found; if Great Britain can not make peace conſiſtently with her dignity and independence, let the war be proſecuted if poſſible, for ſome object that may compenſate for its calamities. There is one of the allies of France whoſe American poſſeſſions, probably in no very good ſtate of defence, would be a moſt valuable prize. Let us endeavour to puniſh the perfidy of Spain, and to gain an equivalent for the Netherlands in Mexico and Peru. The oppreſſion which the native and the African inhabitants of thoſe rich and extenſive territories endure from their Spaniſh tyrants, and the diſaffection which it has occaſoned, are notorious. Why then ſhould we not adopt the energy, without the extravagance, of that policy which has ſerved France in the

Weſt Indies inſtead of fleets and armies? Why ſhould we not enliſt enthuſiaſm into our ſervice, and aid our arms with the generous principles of Engliſh liberty? To ſubdue Spaniſh America by mere force, may be impoſſible To wreſt it from its oppreſſors, by emancipating its enſlaved inhabitants, may be a project as practicable as it would be juſt and glorious. The emancipation that I mean is ſuch as its objects are capable of receiving, a deliverance from phyſical evil; from bodily endurance; not the emancipation that was given by the French Convention, which inſtantly placed the ſlave on a footing with the moſt enlightened freeman, in regard to political rights, and which was equally injurious to the happineſs of both freeman and ſlave.

The Weſt India Gentlemen will probably object to this project. Its ſucceſs might endanger what they call their property. He muſt be a wretched politician who does not ſee that the preſervation of our Empire in the Weſt Indies will require a ſpeedy change of ſyſtem with regard to the negroes; thank God that it will require it, and that what could not be obtained from humanity will be wrung from avarice.

I think it is certain that all the troops we have in the Weſt Indies, and all we can conveniently

ſend there, will be inadequate to contend againſt the decree which aboliſhed ſlavery throughout all the territories of the French Republic. We have already felt the influence of this decree ſeverely. But what we have hitherto experienced from it, is trivial in compariſon of what is yet to be apprehended. It's operation is powerful in proportion to it's notoriety, and it becomes every day more and more known to thoſe from whom it is endeavoured to be concealed. We cannot oppoſe it but by ſomething ſimilar to it. We deceive ourſelves if we imagine that we have ſo far brutalized the negroes, or rather degraded them below the ſtate of the brute creation, that they cannot diſtinguiſh between freedom and ſlavery; between a generous deliverer and a cruel tyrant. We muſt meliorate their condition if we expect to retain their fidelity. I hope it was with a view to their happineſs (that, is to their final emancipation, for what happineſs can co-exiſt with ſlavery?) that our ambaſſador was inſtructed to treat concerning them with the French Government. Perhaps his ſuggeſtions related to the plan that was once mentioned in the Houſe of Commons by Mr. Dundas for aboliſhing ſlavery all over the world. Mr. Dundas thought this might be effected in our Weſt-India Iſlands, gradually and without danger, by ſuffering ſlavery to expire with the preſent race of ſlaves, and by giving their maſters a certain right

to

to the ſervices of their children, until the age of twenty-one, as a compenſation for the expence of maintaining them in infancy.

I have long obſerved with regret, the abatement of the virtuous fervor with which the whole nation at one time eſpouſed the cauſe of the injured Africans. We have now ſtronger reaſon than ever to intereſt ourſelves in their welfare. It is connected with our proſperity, perhaps with our independence. We require every poſſible aid to combat the French Republic, and if we refuſe to mitigate the ſervitude of the negroes, now that France offers them freedom, we may not only loſe them as faithful ſervants, but have to oppoſe them as fierce and exaſperated enemies. This might entirely deprive us of our Weſt India poſſeſſions, which are ſo fruitful a ſource of ſupply for the treaſury, or might divert ſo much of our force to defend them, as would leave our more important dominions expoſed to the attacks of the ever vigilant and enterprizing enemy.

Whatever the wiſdom of Parliament may determine with reſpect to the Negroes of our own colonies, I truſt that your Gracet will never be induced by the apprehenſions of ſlave-dealers, to adviſe his Majeſty to reject any honorable project for national aggrandizement, or to heſitate at making one

one grand exertion to emancipate the new world; to obtain an ample indemnity for all our losses; to win such an accession of dominion and renown as would be equivalent to all that the enemy has acquired in both; and to secure an advantageous and glorious peace.

I have the honor to be,

Your Grace's most obedient servant,

JAMES WORKMAN.

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